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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION

Dumping

is

broadly defined as exporting goods

at prices

below those charged on

the domestic market or at prices insufficient to recover the cost of the goods sold

Dumping has been considered an
free

market economy principles

2
.

unfair trading practice

Even though

which

there have been

1
.

interferes with or distorts

many economic

debates

over the fairness of the nature of anti-dumping rules, the anti-dumping actions were the

most popular trade remedy during the 1980s

3
.

During

that period,

anti-dumping measures

were an important issue only for a few developed countries having big and
markets for foreign producers

4

In practice, the four traditional users, the Unites States,

.

'John H. jacksonet al., Legal Problems
2

Id. at

attractive

OF International Economic Relations 671 (1995).

668-669.

3

See

id. at

673-683. William

J.

Davey, another author of the book, criticized the economic

rationale of anti-dumping measures in price discrimination

and below-cost

sales.

According to his view, economic analysis does not justify the application of anti-

dumping

duties in international price discrimination situation because consumers in

importing countries are benefited from the price discrimination and subsequent price
wars. In case of below-cost sales, so long as marginal revenue
cost,

below-cost sales are a justifiable business behavior. Thus,

penalize most short-run below-cost sales.; see also Michael

Regulation of International Trade
justifications for anti-dumping

1

12-120 (1995)

measures

(

Trebilcock et al., supra note

3, at 97.

J.

higher than marginal

it is

hard to justify to

Trebilcock et al., The

analyzing the economic

in three different types

international price discrimination, predatory pricing,
4

is

of dumping, such as

and intermittent dumping

).

:

2

the

EC, Canada, and

1980 to 1988

Australia,

97%

had brought more than

of all actions brought from

5
.

As one of the

four major users, the European

anti-dumping laws. In the European Community,

Community has developed

it is

the

Community

institutions that

have the power to take action against dumped products from third countries
stems from Article

1

13 of the

EEC

which provides

Treaty,

for a

own

its

Common

6
.

This power

Commercial

Policy after the end of the transitional period based on uniform principles including

measures to protect trade such as those

The competence of the Community
States,

period

See

of dumping or subsidies

exclusive with the exception of new

8
.

id.

The

first

regulation

was adopted

in

("30% were brought by producers

more

22%

in

Canada; and

19%

1968

in the

in the

9
.

It

was

7
.

Member

which can adopt national measures against dumped goods during the

Australia;
are

is

to be taken in the case

transitional

substantially revised in 1979 as

United States;

27% were

European Union. The

target

brought

in

of these actions

EU was the largest single target, defending 27% of the actions,
the USA and Australia in total were targeted in fewer that 14% of the

diverse.

while Canada,

The

action").
6

Eugene Creally, judicial Review of Anti-dumping and Other Safe Guard Measures
European Community 44 (1992).
1

See

id. n.

in

the

1

Prior to the end of the transitional period (1969), the

competent to apply

was an obligation
Treaty, the

their

own anti-dumping

to consult at

Member

Community

Member

States

were

From 1962 onwards there
By virtue of article 91 of the

legislation.
level.

States could adopt measures against infra-Community

dumping. This, however, was no longer applicable

at

the end of the third stage of

the transitional period.
8

Ivo

Van Bael

& Jean- Francois

Bellis, International

Trade Law and Practice of the

European Community: Eec Anti-dumpp^g and Other Trade Protection Laws 21 (1986). For
example, Article 133 of the Act of Accession of the United Kingdom and Ireland and
Article

380 of the Act of Accession of Spain and Portugal provided for transitional
However, except the special situations, the EC Commission has the exclusive

periods.

.

3

a result of the

new Anti-dumping Code which was adopted

Multilateral Trade Negotiations

was adopted

ballbearing case"

permitting the

Community

10

1984

12

and amended by Regulation 1761/87

in effect until

On

it

was repealed by

the

14
.

Then

new Regulation 3283/94 16

April 15, 1994, the United States and

to take protective

13

the Council Regulation 2423/88

1

15

had

.

10 other countries signed the Final Act

Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade

power

in a

impose anti-dumping duties on components of

authorities to

products which are already subject to duties

been

Tokyo Round of

Then, the opinion of Advocate General Warner

.

in

at the

Negotiations. This

measures against dumped imports under Article 9 1 of the

EEC

Treaty.

'Council Regulation 459/68, 1968 O.J. (L93)

1.

10

Council Regulation 3017/79 on Protection Against
Countries Not

"Case

1

13/77,

Member

Dumped

or Subsidized Imports from

of the European Economic Community, 1 979 O.J. (L339)

NTN Tokyo Bearing Co. Ltd. v. EC

1.

Council, 1979 E.C.R. 1212.

12

Council Regulation 2176/84 of 23 July 1984 on Protection Against
Subsidized Imports from Countries Not

Community, 1984

O.J. (L201)

Member

Dumped

or

of the European Economic

1.

13

Council Regulation 1761/87 of 22 June 1987 amending Regulation (EEC) No. 2176/84

on Protection Against Dumped or Subsidized Imports from Countries Not Member of
the European Economic Community, 1987 O.J. (LI 67) 9.
l4

Creally, supra note 6, at

44

n.3.

15

Council Regulation 2423/88 of

1 1

July 1988 on Protection Against

Subsidized Imports from Countries Not

Member

Dumped

or

of the European Economic Community,

1988 O.J. (L209)l.
16

Council Regulation 3283/94 of 22 December 1994 on Protection Against
Imports from Countries Not
[hereinafter

new

Regulation]

Member of the European Community, 1994

Dumped
O.J. (L349)

1

.

4

marked the culmination of approximately seven and half years of negotiation covering the
most diverse

broadest,

The

multilateral agreements

tariff

were great

Declarations

19
.

new

volume and the

The new Anti-dumping Code

Uruguay Round20

all

.

The

history

17
.

embraced the negotiated

results are

made up of

is

one of the multilateral agreements under

.

results brought the establishment

Organization, which, unlike the former

WTO,

18

results

modern

agreements, eight Understandings and numerous Decisions and

The Uruguay Round

the

in

schedules and other market access commitments

sixteen separate

the

multilateral trade negotiations undertaken in

countries adhering to the

GATT,

of the World Trade
21

has an institutional personality

.

Under

WTO Charter become subject to all of the annexed

agreements, except the fourth annex which consists of four optional sub-annexes

22
.

Ronald K. Lorentzen, Overview of Major Changes Contained in the Uruguay Round
Anti-dumping and Subsidies Agreements 1994 ( PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course
Handbook Series No. B4-7074, 1994).
18

David W. Leebron, An Overview of the Uruguay Round Results, 34 Colum.

J.

Transnat'1

L. 11(1995).
]9

Id. at

35 n.2:

The Agreement Establishing
at

the

World Trade Organization,

1-14 (Dec. 15„1993), 33 I.L.M. 13(1994),

MTN/FA n,

an agreement among the parties

is

thereto in their general capacity to enter into international agreements dealing with
trade. All other

agreements and understandings are formally among the Members

of the World Trade Organization. Decisions and Declarations are by the Ministers
representing those

Member

in the

World Trade Organization, and presumably

have the status of unanimous decisions of the

WTO Ministerial Conference.

20

Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on
Trade 1994 [hereinafter
2

Tariffs

and

URAA]

*See Jackson et al supra note
,

1, at

289-290.

22

Id. at

292.

Annexl contains

GATT

1994

(

including side agreements, understandings and

5

Among

others, the

changes

in dispute settlement process

would enhance

conformity with the multilateral agreements because violation of the

would bring more serious

retaliation against the

procedural areas, the

EC

Council adopted a

GATT obligations
23

non-conforming party

In response to the strengthened structure

the degree of the

of the

.

WTO both in substantive and

new EC Anti-dumping Regulation

implementing the Uruguay Round Anti-dumping Agreement on 22 December 1994

new

URAA.

Regulation does more than merely incorporate the requirements of the

regulates areas not covered

by the

URAA,

.

It

The
also

such as anti-circumvention measures.

This article will examine the relevant issues in the past

EC

anti-dumping

proceedings and compare the past practice with the revised rules in the
Furthermore, the degree of the conformity of the

addressed

24

new

new

Regulation with the

Regulation.

URAA will be

later in the thesis.

the Marrakesh Protocol),

GATS

(

The General Agreement on Trade

in Service)

and

TRIPS (The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights).
Annex2 provides new set of Dispute Settlement Rules and Annex3 is dealing with Trade
Policy Review Mechanism. Those three Annexes are integral parts of the WTO
Agreement and binding all member countries.
23

See generally Leebron, supra note

18,

14-16 (important innovations in the

Rights :Institutional Reform in the
24

New Regulation, supra note

16.

New

new

Remedies Along With
GATT, 88 Am. J. Intl L. 477 (1994).

settlement procedure); see also Andreas F. Lowenfeld,

dispute

CHAPTER n

NEW EC ANTI-DUMPING REGULATION

Before discussing the

new

Regulation,

it

is

structure in the anti-dumping area. There are three

the

EC

institutions involved in

and the European Court of Justice (the Court of Justice).

Commission

that plays the

The Commission

is

most important

role in the

composed of 20 members, who

agreement among the governments of the 15
all

Community

anti-dumping proceedings. They are the Commission, the Council of Ministers

(the Council)

the

helpful to understand the institutional

EC

States

of all,

it

is

anti-dumping proceedings

are appointed

Member

First

26
.

25
.

by unanimous

The Commission decides

of the major substantive issues through the anti-dumping investigation. The

Commission's investigation covers
initiation

virtually all

of the substantive matters, such as

of investigation, determination of normal value and export

price, calculation

of

constructed value, determination of dumping margins, determination of injury and so on.

On

the other hand, the Council does not engage in the actual investigation.

Instead, the Council's primary role is the imposition

Where an

investigation

by the Commission shows

of a definitive anti-dumping duty.

that there is

dumping and

injury,

and

25

See generally George A.Bermann et al., European Community
(explaining the procedure of the

EC

Law 995-1 022

( 1

993)

anti-dumping proceeding).

26

European Update,
states

there
is

:

is

EC

Spain, Italy,

and Procedures 8 (1995). Since each of the five large
France, Germany and the United Kingdom have two Commissioners,
Institutions

unbalance between the

Member

States

and the Commissioners. The Commission

divided into 23 Directorates General, which are further subdivided into sub-

directorates.

Each Commissioner supervises one or two Directorates General. However,
on behalf of the Commission.

their decisions are taken collectively

7

the

Community

interest calls for intervention, a definitive

anti-dumping duty

is

imposed

by the Council, acting by simple majority on a proposal submitted by the Commission
after consultation

with the Advisory Committee

Finally, the Court

27
.

of Justice and the Court of First Instance provides the

opportunities for judicial review of anti-dumping cases and protects procedural rights

under Community law. The Court of Justice used to have the primary jurisdiction over
anti-dumping cases

28
.

However, since

dumping cases has been

A.

March 1994,

1

the jurisdiction over the anti-

transferred to the Court of First Instance

29
.

SUBSTANTIVE ASPECTS OF THE NEW REGULATION: DETERMINATION
OF DUMPING AND INJURY

1.

FIVE PERCENT TEST
The new Regulation

normal value.

It

codifies a test for market viability in the determination of

provides that

consumption constitutes

if volume

of sales of the

5% or more of the

sales

like

product destined for domestic

volume of the product under

27

New Regulation, supra note

16, art. 9 (4); see also

Bermann

et al.,

supra note 25,

at 52-

53 (explaining the Council's voting system); see also European Update, supra note 26,
12 (providing updated information about the Council's voting system).
2&

See Bermann et al., supra note 25,

at

1022.

29

See

id. at

72 ("[A]rticle 168a, introduced by the SEA, authorized the Council by

unanimous vote

fix the jurisdiction
at

new Court of First Instance. The SEA left the Council to
."); see also European Update, supra note 26,
new court

to establish a

over the

.

.

.

16 ("After a series of long debates, the transfer of jurisdiction on anti-dumping and

anti-subsidy cases to the Court of First Instance

was agreed

as

from

1

March

1994.").

at

8

consideration to the

Even though

Community, such

sales shall be used to determine

this provision is introduced for the first

existing practice and has been applied by the
In

EC Commission

proceedings for the

since 1984

first

time

introduced the five percent test to

32
.

Regulation,

it

.

is

an

31
.

that the

EC

anti-dumping

In this case, the exporters concerned objected to the

Commission's use of domestic prices

volume of sales on

reach the level of 5% of exports to
criterion

Commission

new

30

imposing a provisional duty on imports of the electronic typewriters originating

in Japan, the

ground

time in the

normal value

for the establishment

the Japanese market

non-EEC

by the American administration

was too small and

countries that

in similar

of normal values on the
it

did not

would have been used

circumstances

33
.

as a

The Commission

accepted the exporters' complaint. The Commission admitted that the prices on the

domestic market in the country of exportation were, as a
determination of normal value under

GATT and the Community legislation.

since the legislation of other trading partners and the
that

rule, the first prior basis for the

Community's

where the volume of sales on the domestic market

be taken of the fact that the prices of such sales

may be

is

However,

past practice

showed

relatively small, account

must

influenced by other than normal

30

New Regulation, supra note

URAA

provides

16, art. 2 (2); see also

URAA supra note 20, n.

2,

The

that:

Sales of the like product destined for consumption in the domestic market

of the exporting country

shall

normally be considered a sufficient quantity for the

determination of the normal value
sales

if

such sales constitute 5 percent or more of the

of the product under consideration to the importing Member, provided that a

lower ratio should be acceptable where the evidence demonstrates that domestic
sales at such lower ratio are nonetheless

of sufficient magnitude to provide for a

proper comparison.
il

See Van Bael

&

Bellis,

supra note

8,

at 36.

"Electronic Typewriters (Japan) 1984 O.J. (L335) 43
33

M

9

commercial considerations and

that their quantities

might so residual or so negligible

that
34

they could not be considered as reliably reflecting prices in the ordinary course of trade

Upon

this reasoning, the

Commission established

the normal value

constructed value for the two exporters

whose volume of the

on the domestic market was equal to or

less

Community35 Before
.

than

Electronic Typewriters, the

sales

on the basis of the

of individual models

5% of the volume of exports to the
Commission had used various terms

describe the special circumstance which did not permit proper comparison

of legal certainty

in

Community. Since

Justice

37
.

.

In the matter

then, the five percent

had been applied systematically without any deep argument about the

five percent test

36

to

determining market viability, adoption of the five percent rule was a

turning point in anti-dumping proceedings in the
test

.

However,

by a Korean exporter

this five percent test
in a later case

38
.

was challenged

in front

In this case, Goldstar,

legality

of the

of the Court of

Korean exporter of

34

Id.

'5

Id

36

See Creally, supra note

6, at 51 (Potato Granules (Canada) 1981 O.J. (LI 16) 1 1 (minimal
were involved), Ferrochromium (South Africa, Surinam, Turkey, Zimbabwe)
1983 O.J. (LI 61) 15 (quantities involved were insufficient), Unwrought Aluminum
(Norway, USSR, Yugoslavia, Surinam) 1984 O.J. (L57) 19 (small quantities were
involved), Ballbearings (miniature) (Singapore, Japan) 1984 O.J. (L79) 8 (virtually no

quantities

sale)).
37

Opinion of Mr. Advocate General Van Gerven

Co

v Council of the
European Community, Reports of Cases (1992), 677; See also Creally, supra note 6 at
51; Electronic Typewriters (Japan) 1984 O.J. (L335) 43; Photocopiers (Japan) 1986 O.J.
(L239) 5; Dot Matrix Printers (Japan) 1988 O.J. (LI 30) 12; Video Cassette Tapes (Hong
Kong, South Korea) 1989 O.J. (L174) 1; Compact Disk Players (Japan, South Korea)
1989 O.J. (L205)
1990 O.J. (L38)

5;

1;

Ltd.

Ferro Silicon (Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Benezuela, Yugoslavia)

Ballbearings (Thailand) 1990 O.J. (LI 52) 24; Small Screen Colour

TV Receivers (Hong Kong,
38

in Goldstar

China) 1991 O.J. (LI 4) 31.

Case C- 105/90, Goldstar Co. Ltd.

v.

Council, 1992 E.C.R. 677.

10

compact disk
than

5%

players, argued that even though the

of the volume of exports to the Community,

domestic prices permit a proper comparison

from the

test,

by saying

that the

39

volume of sales on

for

It

sales

did not necessarily

"5%

the

players,

mean

greater
that

rule,"

volume of its domestic

sales

which was expressed by the

failed to take into consideration the characteristics

compact disk

was

asked for a special treatment, exemption

the domestic market as a percentage of exports to the

Commission

Korean market

.

it

Commission assessed

only in relative terms, applying the so-called

that the

volume of domestic

Community and

and

size

of the

which during the reference period amounted

only to sales of 5,000 units. The Court of Justice did not reject the basic concept of the

argument

that the five percent rule is not

an absolute borderline in market viability

40
.

The

Court of Justice, however, held that 5,000 units represented a considerable percentage of
exports of Korean compact disc players to the

namely 14%, and

that the domestic sales

pattern of price formation

depart from the

Community during

by Goldstar were

sufficient to permit a

on the Korean market. Consequently,

5% practice

41
.

the reference period,

it

normal

was unnecessary

Similar disputes were raised in Brother

42
.

to

In this case, the

applicants also argued that domestic sales of the products concerned were too small to be

used as a basis for establishing normal values

43
.

The Court of Justice

rejected their

arguments, not because the argument was wrong, but because there was no factual basis
supporting their argument

wSee
40

41

42

43

44
.

Under the new Regulation, those arguments

id.

See

id.

See

id.

Case 250/85, Brother Industries Ltd. v Council 1988 E.C.R. 5683.
Opinion of Mr. Advocate General Van Gerven, supra note 37.

"Id.

will

no longer

11

be raised because

However,

it

it

gives the statutory guideline in determining market viability.

should be noted that there

Electronic Typewriters and in the
the phrase "equal to or less than

new

is

a slight difference between the

Regulation. In the

5%," which meant

Community

to the

the

new Regulation

using a different term, namely
find an opposite result in the

Regulation provides that
concerned, those sales

if the prices are

may be

in

Noelle case

46
.

Commission used

5% of domestic

"5%

same

or more." Consequently, the
situation.

In addition, the

45
.

The Court of Justice already expressed

The Court of Justice deduced the

5%

Court of Justice rejected the allegation by saying that although

community does not

to the

necessarily

less than

mean

did not reflect a representative market
the

of the

same

as the

5% test.

new provision

47
.

the

rule to determine

5%

not.

The

of the

that the choice

of a

reference country could not be regarded as appropriate and reasonable, a figure of

is

new

used as a basis for the determination of normal value

whether an alleged third country market economy had a representative market or

volume of exports

sales of

considered representative for the market

regardless of the five percent requirement

same view

in

did not permit a proper comparison. However,

volume of exports

new Regulation could

case, the

that the exact

the

is

first

wording

1

.25%

This reasoning of the Court of Justice in Noelle

in that the representativeness

Generally speaking, even though there

is

room

could negate applicability
for the

Community

authorities' discretions to be involved, especially in determining the representativeness

a market

which accounts

for less than

5%

of domestic

the legal certainty in anti-dumping proceedings in the

45

New Regulation, supra note

46

Case C- 16/90, Noelle

A1

Id.

v.

16, art.

2

sales, this provision will

Community. As

improve

a result, the

(2).

Hauptzollamt Bremen-Freihafen, 1991 E.C.R. 5163.

of

12

method used

to evaluate the representativeness

main concern

a

2.

in the

of sales

in

domestic markets

is

likely to be

market viability area.

SALES BELOW COST AND CONSTRUCTED VALUE
The

URAA provides that sales below cost may be disregarded in the calculation

of normal value only

if

such sales are

reasonable period of time

48
.

And

general rule. Article 2 (4) of the

URAA 49

.

Under

at prices that

also, the

new

Article 2 (4), the

do not permit cost recovery within a

URAA sets certain conditions clarifying the

Regulation incorporates those changes in the

Commission

is

required to meet three requirements to

disregard below cost sales in determining normal value.
First, the

below-cost sales should be

made within an extended period of time.

Article 2 (4) (b) clarifies that the extended period of time should normally be one year but

no case be

shall in

less than six

months. In other words,

domestic market have been made

less

new

is

considered to be met

made

4S

See

at

unit cost
51
.

Thus,

50
.

note 20,

20%

in substantial quantities.

Where

the

or more, the substantial quantity test

is

not less than

if

more than 80% of total volume of domestic

a profitable level, normal value

URAA, supra

cost sales in a

Regulation. There were similar provisions in

Second, the below cost sales should be made

volume of sales below

some below

than six months, the Commission could not

disregard the below cost sales under the

Regulation 2176/84 and 2423/88

if

would be calculated

sales

were

as the weighted average

art. 2.2.1.

49

New Regulation, supra note

16, art. 2 (2).

50

Id.

Contrary to the

new

Regulation, Regulation 2423/88 did not mention about a time

period regarding the below-cost sales.
5

'New Regulation, supra note

16, art. 2 (4)(b).

13

sales prices

of all transactions including below cost

applied the 20/80 test in

Microwave Ovens 52

sales.

Recently, the

Commission held

In that case, the

.

Commission

average domestic sales prices should be used to determine normal value where

more 80% of total
amounted from

sales

20%

remaining profitable

to

was made

at a profitable level.

And,

However,

profitable level, all transactions

if less

than

20%

of domestic sales were made

selling price

is

in

enough

flexibility in

also considered to be

in the ordinary

therefore, will not be disregarded in the determination

more

is

below the weighted average

temporary below-cost sales will be considered to be

quantity test will give

clear

at a

over disregarding below-cost sales in the

determination of normal value. The substantial quantity test

where the weighted average

or

as an average of

would be disregarded. This reasoning seems

to substantially reduce the controversy

all

if those profitable sales

80%, normal value should be established

sales.

that

unit cost

53
.

met
Thus,

course of trade and

of normal value. The substantial

domestic price policy to manufacturers

who

sell

both domestic and foreign markets because temporary below cost sales will be

regarded as being in the ordinary course of trade.
Finally, the last condition to exclude

is

that

domestic sales are made

at prices

within a reasonable period of time
the safe harbor clause of the

54

URAA

.

below cost

sales in determining

which do not provide

Article 2 (4) (a) of the

55
.

normal value

for the recovery of all costs

new

Regulation incorporates

This safe harbor clause also will provide some

52

Microwave Ovens

(

the People's Republic of China, the Republic of Korea, Thailand,

Malaysia) 1995 O.J. (LI 56)

5.

"New Regulation, supra note
54

Id. art.

16, art. 2 (4)(b).

2 (4)(a).

55

see generally Alan F.

dumping Law:

Holmer

et al.,

Enactment and Rejected Amendments

to the Anti-

In Implementation or Contravention of the Anti-dumping Agreement?, 29

14

degree of elasticity in price policy especially for those business sectors which are
suffering from severe fluctuations in

raw material markets. But

for this provision,

manufacturers should adjust prices of their products whenever those prices
unstable production costs occurred by the fluctuation in the

fall

under

raw material markets.

Furthermore, Article 2 (5) provides that cost shall normally be calculated on the
basis of the records kept
in

by the party under investigation, provided

that such records are

accordance with the generally accepted accounting principles of the country concerned

and

it

and

sale

is

shown

of the product under consideration

will allow the

3.

that the records reasonably reflect the costs associated with the production

Community

56
.

These changes for the definition of costs

authorities less discretion than in the past

57
.

START-UP COST

(a)

Result of the

The

URAA

URAA provides that sales below cost calculations will be adjusted for

circumstances in which costs are affected by start-up operations
provision

is

that costs incurred at the initial stages

58
.

The premise of this

of an industry's production easily

Law. 502 (1995) ("In the URAA, it establishes a safe harbor, instead of a fixing
term, by which prices that are below cost at the time of sale but above weighted average
Int'l

cost for the period of investigation will automatically be considered to provide for the

recovery of costs within a reasonable time").
56

New Regulation, supra note

16, art. 2 (5).

57

Edwin A. Verlmust

& Paul Waer,

The Post Uruguay Round EC Anti-Dumping

Regulation: After a Pit Stop, Back in the Race, Journal of World Trade (Law-

Economics-Public policy), April 1995,

at 56.

58

see

Holmer

et al.,

supra note 55

at

484; see also

URAA,

supra note 20,

art.

2.2.1.1

("[C]osts shall be adjusted appropriately .... for circumstances in which costs during
the period of investigation are affected by start-up operations.").

15
create the appearance of below-cost pricing

59
.

An

adjustment for such costs could be

significant in cases involving high-technology products,

up costs and short

life

cycles

60
.

The

which typically have high

URAA further provides that, for start-up operations,

an adjustment to costs shall be made to reflect the costs

at the

end of the

or if that period extends beyond the period of investigation, the

start-up period

it is

to distinguish

not clear

how broadly

or narrowly the concept of start-up should be

62
.

Since the

URAA does not specify a detailed method of the

approach to the provision, the choices of how the issues should be addressed
individual governments as long as they

Implementation of the

comply with the

make

URAA

.

the provision of the

URAA requiring the

a special cost adjustment for start-up operations

establishing a constructed normal value

see

Holmer

et al., supra

60

Id

61

URAA, supra note

62

to the

63

when

it

costs of production for purposes of determining whether domestic sales are

59

is left

URAA

The new Regulation incorporates
authorities to

.

between annual model changes and a new product as well as

specific costs to be adjusted

(b)

61

URAA does not provide a definition of what constitutes the end of a start-

up process. Thus,

viewed

note 55

64
.

It

calculates

below cost or

provides that:

at 484.

20, n. 6.

Id.

"id.

At 487.

64

Ivo

Van

Bael, The

239(1995).

,

most recent costs which

can reasonably be taken into account by the authorities during the investigation

However, the

start-

1

994 Anti-dumping Code And The

New EC

Anti-dumping Regulation

16

Where

the costs for part of the period for cost recovery are affected by the

use of new production

low capacity

facilities requiring substantial additional

utilization rates,

which

investment and by

are the result of start-up operations

which

take place within or during part of the investigation period, the average costs for
the start-up phase shall be those applicable under the above-mentioned allocation
rules, at the

end of such a phase, and

shall

be included

at that level, for the

period

concerned, in the weighted-average cost referred to in paragraph 4(a). The length

of the start-up period

shall

be determined in relation to the circumstances of the

producer or exporter concerned, but shall not exceed an appropriate

of the period for cost recovery. For

this

that period shall be taken into account in so far as

verification visits

investigation

This

is

and within three months from the

which extends

it is

initiation

submitted prior to

of the

65
.

a subordinate provision of Article 2 (5). Article 2(5) already provides that

the calculation of costs shall be based

which would

portion

adjustment to costs applicable during the

investigation period, information relating to a start-up phase

beyond

initial

on the generally accepted accounting

allocate, if any, general start-up costs over a reasonable

principles,

number of years 66

.

Thus, the focus of Article 2 (5) (b) seems to deal with matters not covered by the general
cost allocation rules, such as

low production volume

Another source of potent controversy

URAA,

as to the length

does address

65

this

is

in a start-up

phase

that the provision is

67
.

ambiguous,

of the start-up period. However, the Explanatory

problem.

It

like the

Memorandum

notes that a fixed term of the start-up period would be

New Regulation, supra note

more

16, art. 2 (5)(b).

66

Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC) on Protection against

Dumped

members of the European Community, 30 September
Memorandum, at 3 [Hereinafter Explanatory Memorandum].
Countries not

h7

Id.

Imports from

1994, Explanatory

17

controversial and might not account for differences between products and industries

seems desirable not
characteristics

to define specific terms because

of a specific product or industry

in

it is

68
.

It

crucial to take into account

determining a start-up period. However,

the period should not be limited by the safe harbor period in the

URAA,

because the

URAA does not clearly permit national authorities to require cost recovery within one
year

69
.

Once

again, the

Community

authorities' discretion will be a

key factor

in the

determination of the start-up period.
Finally, the three-month time limit of the last sentence in Article 2 (5) (b)

viewed as an

effort to

investigations under

meet the

strict

The

time limits for the completion of anti-dumping

which provisional

the initiation of the investigation
start-up questions

is

duties should be

imposed within 9 months

after

70
.

have not been raised frequently

in the past

anti-dumping

proceedings. In those cases, the start-up disputes were not related to the cost adjustment
dealt with in Article 2 (5) (b)

Receivers

6i

Id.

72
,

of the

New Regulation

a Thai producer claimed that

its

71
.

Recently, in Color Television

production plant was in a start-up situation

The Explanatory Memorandum provides that;
[I]t is a lot more difficult to define the length of a

start-up period.

Consideration has been given to specifying a normal sales quantity or setting a
precise duration for the length of a start-up phase, e.g. 6 months.
definitions would, however, be controversial

Such

specific

and could take no account of

differences between products and industries.
69

Vulmust and Waer, supra note

10

See Van Bael, supra note 64,

57, at 58.

at

240.

71

See Aspartame (Japan, the United States of America) 1990 O.J. (L330)

16.

An

exporter

argued that the Community Industry was injured by the start-up phase; see also Plain

Paper Photocopiers (Japan) 1986 O.J. (L239)

5.

72

Color Television Receivers (Malaysia, the People's Republic of China, the Republic of

18

during the investigation period. Therefore, the cost of production during that period

could not possibly be in the ordinary course of trade. The Commission rejected the

argument by saying that the relatively higher costs during the investigation period,

compared

was

to other periods,

One

related to a start-up situation.

based on the
provision.

test

the result of lower capacity utilization,

notable point

is

that the producer's

argument was

of an ordinary course of trade because of the absence of a start-up

However, under the new Regulation, the request

will directly refer to Article 2(5) (b)

different under the

new

and the

result in

and disputed more frequently

increased discretion

for the start-up adjustment

Color Television Receiver would be

Regulation which recognizes that low capacity utilization

sufficient evidence to merit a start-up adjustment.

will be increased

which are not

is left

to the

authorities' fair application

is

Community

At any

rate,

may be

claims for the adjustment

in the future proceedings. Since relatively

authorities in the start-up area, the

a crucial factor and they must build a consistent practice in

near future.

:

4.

SGA AND PROFIT IN CONSTRUCTIVE NORMAL VALUE
Where

the domestic market prices

Commission has two
the

alternative

new Regulation provides

methods

do not permit proper comparisons, the
for determining

that if there are

no or

normal value. Article 2 (3) of

insufficient sales

of a

like

product in

the ordinary course of trade, or if a particular market situation affects the domestic market

prices to the degree that those sales

do not permit a proper comparison, the Commission

can determine normal value on the basis of either constructed value or export prices to an
appropriate third country

73
.

The Commission has had wide

Korea, Singapore and Thailand) 1994 O.J. (L225) 50.
73

New Regulation, supra note

16, art. 2 (3).

discretion in selecting a

19

proper method between the abovementioned alternatives

74
.

In practice, the

Commission

has preferred the constructed value to the third-country export price. The Commission's
reasoning was based on the possibility that export sales to another country could have

been

at

dumped

prices;

however, constructed value offered more reasonable grounds for

the determination of normal value

75
.

Constructed value consists of costs for production in the country of origin,
reasonable amounts of selling, general and administrative costs (hereinafter SGA), and
profit.

The

cost of production can be divided into the following sub-categories: costs of

and packing

materials, costs of direct labor, manufacturing overheads, financing costs,

costs

76
.

The material

costs cover

the product concerned.

It

the expenses of parts and

all

also includes

all

are

14

all

in a period

77
.

Direct labor costs

labor costs that can be identified with a particular product or process

composed of pay, employee

See Creally, supra note

benefits and other employee-related expenses

6, at 84,88,

in

the material costs associated with the

manufacture of a component that have been incurred
include

components incorporated

78
.

They

79
.

and 94.

75

See Creally, supra note

6, at 53;

See also, Ballbearings (miniature) (Japan, Singapore)

1980 O.J. (L79) 8 (The Minebea Group requested
the basis of the prices at

which

its

independent buyer on the Japanese market. The
those exports

it

that

normal value be constructed on

products exported from Singapore are

first

resold to an

EC Commission held that with

regard to

could not be ruled out that dumping was being practiced by Minebea on

the Japanese market.).
16

11

See

Van Bael

&

Bellis,

supra note

8,

at 37.

Id. at 38.

n Id.
79

Id.

The term

differentials,

security

'pay' covers basic pay, overtime pay, incentive pay, bonuses

and

shift

and 'employee benefits' indicates housing, holiday pay, retirement, social

programs and so on.

20
Manufacturing overhead concerns
product

80
.

And, when a

particular loan

concerned, the interest of the loan

Under Regulation 2423/88,

SGA

expenses and

profit.

The

is

related to the manufacture of the product

included as a financing cost. After the calculation of

is

the costs of production, the next step

the

expenses incidental to and necessary for the

all

is

the calculation of

SGA

expenses and

Article 2(3)(b)(ii) provided several

first priority

was

that the

SGA

ways

profit.

to determine

expenses and profit

could be calculated by reference to the expenses incurred and the profit realized by the

producer or exporter on the profitable sales of the like product in the domestic market. If
such data was unavailable or unreliable or was not suitable for use, the next method of
determination for

SGA

and

profit

was

to refer to the expenses incurred

by other producers

or exporters on the country of origin or export on their profitable sales of the like

product

81
.

And,

if neither

of the two methods had not been available, the

incurred could be calculated by reference to the sales

made by

SGA

expenses

the exporter or other

producers or exporters in the same business sector in the country of origin or export or on

any other reasonable

and

profit

might not

was

basis.

that the

The major controversy concerning

Commission's

SGA

practice, using only profitable domestic sales,

expense and profit

reflect the true

the determination of

82
.

80

Id.The manufacturing overheads include following items, indirect labor, supervision,
depreciation, rent, power, maintenance and repairs, and accounting adjustments to

inventory.
81

Council Regulation (EEC) 2423/88, supra note

15, art. 2 (3)(b)(ii).

82

See Creally, supra note

6, at 56;

see generally Paul Waer, Constructed Normal Values in

EC Dumping Margin Calculations

a Realistic Approach?, Journal of
World Trade (Law-Economics-Public Policy), Journal of World Trade (Law-EconomicsPublic policy), August 1993, 47-80 (providing specific numerical examples of
calculation of

SGA

and

:

Friction, or

profit in constructed

normal value).

21

The
profit

83
.

URAA now provides international

This seems to be an effort to reduce the gaps

adopted by each country. Article 2.2.2 of the

SGA

standards in the calculation of

among

SGA

and

the different practices

URAA requires national authorities to base

expenses and profit on actual data pertaining to production and sales

in the ordinary

course of trade of the like product by exporter or producer under investigation. Article 2
(6)

of the new Regulation closely follows the

URAA provisions.

order of precedence for the use of other producers' or exporters'
like

product over the

producer concerned

SGA

84
.

and

profit in the

URAA,

domestic market of the country of origin
referred to the expenses
distinction

and

listed as alternatives

SGA

the

86
.

SGA

It is

and

different

84

Vulmust and Waer, supra note

supra note 20,

Article 2 (6) also

be based on the

of origin or export
is

87
.

The

important, since

.

there

is

a

URAA. The new Regulation

tacks on the phrase "in the ordinary course of trade" in Article 2 (6)

URAA,

.

number of cases 88 However,

between the new Regulation and the

83

profit for the

from Regulation 2423/88, which

profits incurred in the country

those countries are not identical in an increasing

85

profit should

between the country of origin and the country of export

significant difference

and

strict

same general category of products of the

These options are merely

provides that, in conformity with the

does not give a

It

89

(ii)

.

This limitation

art. 2.2.2.

57, at58.

85

Edwin A. Verlmust & Paul Waer, EC Anti-Dumping Law and Practice after the
Uruguay Round-A New Lease of Life?, Journal of World Trade (Law-Economics-Public
policy), April 1994, at 12.
86

New Regulation, supra note

87

16, art. 2 (6) (I) (ii)

Vulmust and Waer, supra note

(iii).

85, at 12.

"Id.
89

Vulmust and Waer, supra note

57, at58.

The

limitation has not

been applied consistently

22
does not appear in the

URAA. The

justify the calculation

of the profit margin on profitable sales only

Commission disregarded

restriction is

viewed as the Commission's
90
.

effort to

In the past, the

non-profitable sales in calculating profit margin and

all

Regulation 2423/88 provided that

SGA

expenses and profit should be based on the

profitable sales in the domestic market. This change will result in different determinations

of profit

in

new

connection with Article 2(4) of the

Regulation, the

Commission

is

Regulation. Under the

not allowed to disregard

domestic market because Article 2(4) of the

new

all

new

non-profitable sales in the

Regulation provides the scope of the

ordinary course of trade. According to Article 2(4), below-cost sales in the domestic

market

may

be treated as not part of the ordinary course of trade only

made within an extended period of time

in substantial qualities

and

provide for the recovery of all costs within a reasonable time period

Commission should meet those conditions

if

such sales are

at prices
9I
.

which do not

Therefore, the

to disregard non-profitable sales in the

determination of profit margins.

5.

DETERMINATION OF DUMPING MARGIN
The

dumping

92
.

calculation of a

At

dumping margin

a glance, since a

is

the final step in the determination of

dumping margin means

the

amount by which

the normal

value exceeds the export price, calculation of dumping margins look simple, namely,
subtracting export price from the normal value

as

it

does not show up

in Article 2 (6) (I)

and

93
.

But the calculation has not been

(iii).

90

Id.

91

New Regulation, supra note

92

See Van Bael

9i

See

Id.

&

Bellis,

16, art. 2 (4); see also

supra note

8,

at 64.

supra pp. 12-13.

:

23

methods used

clarified. In practice, the

of the most controversial issues
Ballbearings

94
I

n95

and

for determination

was delivered by

in the

for determining

dumping margins have been one

EC's anti-dumping proceedings, especially

after

During the middle of 1980s, the Commission's methodology

.

of the dumping margin began to change. The outcome of the change
the Council concerning Ballbearings

from Japan and Singapore

though, during the same period the Anti-dumping Regulation 3017/79
since both Regulations 3017/79 and 2176/84 had the

97

96
.

Even

was amended 98

same provisions regarding

,

the

determination of dumping margin under the Article 2(13), the changed provision could
not be a solution to the controversy over the Commission's methodology of determining

of the dumping margin. The Article 2(13) of 2176/84 merely enumerated four bases

which could be used

for calculation

of dumping margins where prices are varied

99
.

They

94

See James K. Lockett,

EEC Anti-dumping Law and Trade Policy After Ballbearings II

Discretionary Decisions Masquerading As Legal Progress, 8

Nw.

J. Int'l

L.

& Bus.

365,

commonly-known name of following five decisions of the
European Court of Justice. They are NTN Toyo Bearing Co. v. Council, Import Standard
Office v. Council, Nippon Seiko K.K. v. Council, Koyo Seiko Co. v. Council and Nachi
n. 12.

Ballbearings

I is

the

Fujikoshi Corp. v. Council.
95

See

id.

nn, 12,17

& 78.

Ballbearing

dumping cases appealed

II is

to the Court

the well

of Justice

known term

indicating five Anti-

of affirmative dumping

after a decision

by the Council. Four of the five appeals were by the same Japanese companies party to

which consists of NTN Toyo Bearing Co. v. Council, Import Standard
Nippon Seilo L.L. v. Council, Koyo Seiko Co. v. Council and Nachi
Fujiloshi Corp. v. Council. The Ballbearings II cases are NTN Toyo Bearing Co. v.
Council, Nachi Fujiloshi Corp. v. Council, Koyo Seiko Co. v. Council, Nippon Seilo
L.L. v. Council and Minebea Co. v. Council.
Ballbearings

I

Office v. Council,

96

97

98

Ballbearings (miniature) (Japan, Singapore), 1984 O.J. (L193)

1.

Council Regulation 3017/79, supra note 10.
Council Regulation 2176/84, supra note

12.

99

New Regulation, supra note

16, art. 2 (13)(a).

Of course, where

prices did not vary, the

24

were the transaction-by-transaction

basis, the

most frequent price

price basis and the weighted average price basis.

on one of the said bases

100
.

It

method

in a

new proceeding even when

method

in the calculation

(a)

it

was

in a given case did not prevent

of one base

Community

The dumping margin could be

should be noted that

that the use

it

basis, the representative

the

Community

them from using

involves the same product

101
.

calculated

authorities'

view

a different

The

of dumping margin was a discretionary matter

selection of a

left to

the

authorities.

Origin of Controversy
In Ballbearings

I,

102

the Court of Justice ruled in favor of the applicants and annulled

the Regulation imposing definitive Anti-dumping duties

on

certain companies. After the

Court of Justice's decision, the Federation of European Bearing Manufacturers
Association lodged a

new

complaint alleging dumping and injury by the Japanese

producers. In this Anti-dumping procedure, the

agreed to

settle the investigation

Commission and

the Japanese companies

by accepting the undertakings. In March 1983, the

European ballbearing industry argued

that despite the undertakings,

dumping and

injury

calculation of dumping margin a simple substraction of export price from normal value.
100

New Regulation, supra note

16, art.

2(13)

(b).

101

See

Van Bael

different

&

method
It is

Bellis,

supra note

in calculation

8,

of the

The Council's reasoning about using the
dumping margin from Ballbearings I was that:
at 65.

correct that in former ball bearings proceedings, the application of the

transaction by transaction

method was

to be neither feasible for foreign exporters

nor for the Commission services because of the numerous individual sales
transactions involved.

However, experience has shown

view

technological progress

of, inter alia, the

systems, this method
102

is

feasible.

See generally Lockett, supra note 94.

made

in the

in office

meantime

that, in

equipment and

25

were

still

occurring to the

Commission

initiated

Community

Upon

industry.

the allegations in the complaint, the

an investigation concerning imports of certain ballbearings

originating in Japan and Singapore. After a provisional decision, the

Commission

imposed a provisional anti-dumping duty and revoked the undertakings.
by the exporters involved another offer

for

new

A counteraction

undertakings, which were rejected by the

Commission. Following the provisional duty by the Commission, the Council confirmed
the

Commission's findings and imposed

November

Regulation

103
,

duties. In

October and

as Ballbearings JX In the contested

were determined on the weighted average

on the transaction-by-transaction
to ex-factory prices, the
their

known

normal values and export prices were calculated on different bases. While

the normal values

above

Anti-dumping

1984, the Japanese companies filed applications to annul the Council

Regulation imposing definitive duties,

them

definitive

basis. After

Commission

basis, the export prices

making the necessary deductions

artificially

were

to bring

reduced export prices that were

comparable normal values to the level of the normal values. Then,

it

determined the dumping margins by comparing the weighted average normal values and
individual export prices in

which some had already been reduced.

amounts exceeding the normal values were not taken

dumping margins. The drawback of this method
inflate the

sales

dumping margins because

made

at prices in

that since the

the

into account in determining the

for the exporters

excess of normal value

104
.

Anti-dumping Regulation stipulated

""Ballbearings (miniature), supra note 96.

See

Van Bael

&

Bellis,

supra note

8,

was

Commission did not give any

at 66.

that

it

tended to

credit for export

The Commission's justification was
that the

amount by which the normal value exceeded the export

]04

In other words, the

dumping margin was

price, the

the

concept of a negative

26

dumping margin should be excluded from

the scope of the

dumping margin 105 By
.

same reason, the comparison of a weighted average normal value with

dumped and non-dumped

export price containing both

Anti-dumping Legislation

106

sales

was

Several applicants in Ballbearings

.

a

the

weighted average

against the community's

II

argued that the

unprecedented methodology used by the Community authorities was against the
principles of legal certainty

administration

and legitimate expectation and breached the rules of sound

107
.

The Court of Justice

rejected

all

of the allegations.

First,

with regard to the

principle of legal certainty, the Court of Justice decided that since this case

was

a review

proceeding under Article 14 of the Regulation 3017/79, which allowed the earlier

measures to be amended, repealed, or annulled, the principle of legal certainty did not
prevent the re-examination

108
.

Regarding the principle of legitimate expectation, the Court

of Justice said that the institutions had a margin of discretion and thus the use of the same

method was not a

legitimate expectation. Finally, the Court of Justice stated that "the

rules of sound administration cannot prevent the institutions

from using the powers

conferred upon them by the regulations in force". The institutions' methodology was

approved by the Court of Justice through Ballbearings

Since Ballbearings

II.

II,

the use of

inconsistent methodologies to the determination of dumping margins has been a

consistent practice in the

" 5 Seeid.

™See

]01

EC

anti-dumping proceedings

at 67, n. 14.

id.

See Lockett, supra note 94,

mSee

at

389.

id.

mSee Van Bael &

Bellis,

supra note

8,

at

66-67.

109
.

27
(b) Fair

Comparison Requirement

URAA

in the

and the

New EC

Regulation.

Major exporting countries have been complaining of the practice by the

Community

authorities for a long time.

During the Uruguay Round Anti-dumping

negotiations, one of the major negotiating objectives of many countries
explicit requirement that there be a fair

normal value

in

was

to include an

comparison between the export price and the

determining whether dumping has occurred. Indeed, one of the major

accomplishments of the negotiations
requirement in Article 2.4 of the

is

the preeminence of the explicit fair comparison

new Code

1

10
.

Since the prior Anti-dumping Codes did

not provide the specific standard for comparing export prices to import prices, each

country has adopted

its

own

rule arbitrarily,

which usually increased dumping margins or

even created dumping margins that would not have existed
For example, as already mentioned in Ballbearings
the

same

II,

in a reasonable

comparison.

even though a product has exactly

price fluctuation both in domestic and foreign markets, the product could be

considered as being

dumped under the

each transaction price in
the exporting country

111
.

its

old practice, which allowed authorities to compare

own market to

To provide

the weighted average

a universal guideline, the

home market

new Code

price in

states that the

existence of margins of dumping during the investigation phase shall normally be
established on the basis of a comparison of a weighted average normal value with a

weighted average of prices of all comparable export transactions or by a comparison of

U0

See Holmer, supra note 55,

at

497.

in

See Ballbearings, supra note 96. The

EC Commission held that a

comparison of normal

dumped and non-dumped sales
EC Council's amendment of the Community's Anti-

value with a weighted average export price comprising

would be in contradiction with the
dumping legislation. Therefore it has been

a consistent practice

of the

EC Commission

dumping margin
except in cases where for administrative reasons it was not considered feasible to employ
the transaction-by-transaction method or where the averaging of the export prices would
have had no effect on the overall outcome of the proceedings.
not to use weighted average export prices for the determination of the

28

normal value and export prices on a transaction-to-transaction basis
provision, however, does not eliminate
authorities find a pattern

all

112
.

This

new

chances of applying the old practice.

of export prices which

differ significantly

purchasers, regions or time periods, and if an explanation

is

among

provided as to

If the

different

why

such

differences cannot be taken into account appropriately by the use of a weighted average-

to-weighted or transaction-to transaction comparison, the old practice

The new

EC

Regulation reproduced the

URAA provisions. Here,

think about the economic structure of the
the general rule in Article
authorities' application

would be very

Member

States to find out

2(11) of the new Regulation

of the Article. In the EC,

significant price differences in

it

Member

many

is

economic

recommended

how the

will affect the

State, the

Community

113
.

to

exception to

Community

on the Member

are

State. Therefore,

maintain a consistent price pattern for

all

the

situations.

If foreign producers adapt their prices to different levels prevailing in

Member

applicable

common knowledge that there

sectors depending

difficult for exporters to

States under those

it

it is

is still

each

authorities could easily invoke the exception because the

fact that the price pattern significantly differs

among

the

Member

States meets the

requirement for application of the exception under Article 2(11).

6.

DE MINIMIS DUMPING MARGIN
Article 5.8 of the

URAA provides that there shall be immediate termination in

cases where the authorities determine that the margin of dumping

minimis

112

is

URAA, supra note

URAA,

de minimis"

4
.

The de

defined as a dumping margin less than 2 per cent, expressed as a percentage

20, art. 2.4.2.

mId.
114

is

supra note 20,

art. 5.8.

29
of the export price"

The export

(3).

.

The new Regulation incorporates

customs valuation"

for

cent de minimis rule

is

6
.

Compared

CIF value since

that is

to the past practice, the 2 per

a slightly higher standard. In the past, duties of less than 2 per

cent have been occasionally imposed
1

the de minimis rule in Article 9

price in the provision should be understood as the

EC's usual base

the

5

7

1
'

.

However,

in

most

cases'

18
,

dumping margins of

per cent or less were considered as minimal and not injurious to the

Community

producers. At any rate, imposition of duties of less than 2 per cent will be disregarded in
the

EC

anti-dumping proceedings as a result of the
Article 9 (3) of the

dumping margins

are

new

below 2

new

rule.

Regulation further provides that such exporters whose

% shall remain subject to the proceeding and may be

reinvestigated in any subsequent country-wide reviews"

U5

de minimis

9
.

This provision

is

inconsistent

Id.

116

See Vulmust and Waer, supra note 85,

what exactly
authorities

is

to

at

14 footnote 32. The

be understood by the export price.

some leeway

in calculating the

margin

It

URAA does not specify

can be assumed that

this leaves

in relation to their usual base for

customs valuation.
117

See also Video Cassettes (the Republic of Korea) 1989 O.J. (LI 74) 1 (the
Council imposed anti-dumping duties of 2.0
and 1.9
to Korean producers).

See

id;

%

%

118

See Creally, supra note

6, at 72;

1983 O.J. (LI 61) 13

dumping margin of 0.3

(a

see also Non-alloyed

Unwrought Aluminum (Egypt)

% was considered de minimis);

Sensitized Paper for Color Photographs (Japan) 1984 O.J. (LI 24) 45 (a

dumping margin

% was considered de minimis); Ceramic Tiles (Spain) 1984 O.J. (LI 68) 35 (a
dumping margin of less than 0.5 % was considered de minimis); Denim (Turkey,
Indonesia, Hong Kong, Macao) 1990 O.J. (L222) 50 (dumping margin was less than
1%); Polyester Yarns (Mexico) 1991 O.J. (L275) 21 (a dumping margin of 0.53 % was
of 0.54

considered de minimis); Polyester Yarns (Taiwan, Indonesia, India, China, Turkey) 1991
O.J. (L276)

7(dumping margins of 0.43

% and 0.26 % were considered de minimis).

119

New Regulation, supra note
62.

16, art. 9 (3); see also

Vulmust and Waer, supra note

57, at

:

30
with

Rima judgment 120

In

.

Rima, the Court of Justice held

that a

producer which obtained

a zero margin in the original investigation could not be included in the review

even though a

initial

121
.

dumping

investigation to an exporter has been terminated due to a

margin below the de minimis percentage, the exporter
procedure under Article

is still

Thus,

subject to the review

of the new Regulation.

1 1

Article 9 (3) also requires an immediate termination of investigation in a case

where the dumping margin

is

the investigation as soon as

it

a

de minimis. Therefore, the Commission should terminate

examines the questionnaire response and finds

dumping margin of less than 2

%

122

that there is

However, the Commission's practice delays the

.

termination by insisting on verifying the reposes on the spot and double-checking the
calculation

123
.

Since the delay of the termination would retard business activities for the

exporters concerned in the
to the

Community market,

prompt termination of investigation

the

in future

Commission must devote

its

attention

anti-dumping proceedings.

7.DETERMTNATION OF INJURY
The most
the

controversial issue in this area

volume of imports.

Article 3.3 of the

cumulative assessment of injury. The

120

n]

See

id.

The Court of Justice

the cumulation of injury in assessing

URAA provides three requirements for

first

Case 216/92, Rima Eletrometalurgia

is

requirement

Sa. v. Council,

is

that the

margin of dumping

1993 E.C.R. 6303.

stated that

Whilst dictates of equal treatment might justify extending the review to
producers and exporters

who were

affected by the anti-dumping duty and

not requested that review, they could not justify the opening of a
investigation into the case of the applicant,
initial investigation,

id.

new

whose products had, following

the

been excluded form application of the anti-dumping duty.

mSee Vulmust and Waer, supra note 57, at 62.
m See

who had

31

established in relation to the imports from each country

volume of import from each country
chapter, the de minimis

is

not negligible

dumping margin

is

124

EC new Regulation. And the

more than de minimis and

As we have

.

one of less than 2

of import has a more complicated definition and there

and the

is

second

is

%

125

disparity

is

.

the

seen in the previous

The

negligible

between the

volume

URAA

a cumulative assessment of the effects of

the imports appropriate in light of the conditions of competition between imported

products and the conditions of competition between the imported products and the like

domestic product

126

Article 3.3 of the

URAA. The

.

Finally,

we

can draw the

last

requirement from the

127

Once

.

the three requirements are

met, national authorities can cumulatively assess the effects of imports

new

(a)

Regulation reproduced Article 3.3 of the

is

.

Article 3 (4) of

129
.

URAA provides that there shall be immediate termination where

determined that the volume of the dumped imports

provision, the

124

URAA

128

Negligible Imports
Article 5.8 of the

it

sentence of

imports of a product from more than one country are

simultaneously subject to anti-dumping investigations

the

first

URAA,

volume of imports

supra note 20,

is

negligible if the

is

negligible

130
.

According

to the

volume of dumped imports from a

art. 3.3.

125

See supra pp. 27-28. Article 5.8 of the
minimis dumping margin.
126

ni

URAA, supra note 20,

URAA also provides the same figure as the de

art. 3.3.

Id.

mId.
129

130

New Regulation, supra note
URAA,

supra note 20,

16, art. 3 (4).

art 5.8.

32
particular country

is

found to account for

the importing country unless countries

less than 3

% of imports of the like product in

which individually account

for less than 3

% of the

imports of the like product in the importing country collectively account for more than 7

% of imports of the like product in the importing country
from the Dunkel

definition
1

Draft,

131
.

This

quite a different

is

which defined the volume of the negligible imports

as a

-percent market share in the importing country or a collective market share of 2.5

percent

132
.

The new Regulation follows the
different

based on market share, but sets out somewhat

numbers. Article 5 (7) of the Regulation provides that proceedings

whose imports represent a market-share of below

against countries

countries collectively account for 3

expect that the

1

market share

1

shall not be

percent, unless such

%or more of Community consumption 133 We can
.

percent test based on the market share

based on import volume in the
total

test

is

more

liberal

than 3 percent

test

URAA until the total imports reach more than a third of

in the importing

country

134
.

Thus, the market share test looks more

reasonable because in certain situations, minute market shares could reach 3 percent of
total imports.

However, the new provision contains a couple of flaws.

burdensome

to administer because

it

may

be more

could be more difficult to obtain data concerning

market share which are typically in the hands of the

ux

It

EC

industry

135
.

And

the other

Id.

132

Vulmust and Waer, supra note

133

New Regulation, supra note

85, at 15.

16, art. 5 (7).

134

Id.
135

See Vulmust and Waer, supra note 57,
import data,

it

is

at 63.

relatively easy to access.

Since the Eurostat

statistics

provides

33

problem
test is

the conflict against the

is

more

liberal in

most

URAA provision.

Even though

it

cases, there could be a particular case in

is

more advantageous

is

viewed as a challengeable violation under the

to exporters. In such cases, the

1

WTO

is

EC

true that the

which the

URAA test

percent test based on market share
136
.

(b) Appropriate Circumstance

The second requirement

is

whether the Community's market situation

appropriate for the cumulation. In the past, the

Commission has frequently used

method of exporter and exporting-country cumulation
imports

137
.

recent

in assessing the

However, there was no automatic cumulation.

case basis. In determining cumulatibility, the

movement of import volumes,

For example, in Polyester Yarn

139
,

It

the

volume of

has been applied on a case by

Commission considered market

shares,

physical characteristics of products and so on

the

Commission took

considering that the volume of imports from

between 1986 and 1987. By

is

all

the cumulation

method

138
.

after

involved countries had been increased

contrast, in Synthetic Fibers

of Polyester, the Commission

exclude products of the American producers from the assessment of the injury because

mSee
137

id. at

64.

Vulmust and Waer, supra note

85, at 14.

mId.
139

Polyester

and

its

Yarn 1988

O.J. (LI 51) 39; see also Creally, supra note 6, at 77;

Salts (Taiwan, Thailand, Indonesia, Republic

Glutamic Acid

of Korea) 1990 O.J. (L56) 23;

Methenamine (Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia) 1 990
O.J. (L104) 14; Photo Albums (Republic of Korea, Hong Kong) 1990 O.J. (L138) 48;
Audio Cassettes in Tapes (Japan, Hong Kong, Republic of Korea) 1990 O.J. (L313) 5;
Small Screen Color TV Receivers (China, Hong Kong) 1991 O.J. (LI 4) 31; Artificial
Corundum (USSR, Poland, China, Hungary, Brazil, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia) 1991
O.J. (L275) 27.

34
the

volume of exports was

relatively small

the exports of other countries

the

140

As

.

and the quality of the product differed from

a result,

Commission's past practice has been

when

it

comes

to the

second requirement,

largely consistent with the provision in the

new

Regulation.

(c)

Requirement of Simultaneous Investigation

On the
will affect the

other hand, the third requirement, the simultaneousness of investigation,

Commission's past practice more or

simultaneousness means that
country, and a

if duties

new proceeding and

less.

The requirement of

have been imposed on a certain product from a

investigation

is

started against the

product from different countries, any alleged injury caused by
latter

dumped

products from the

countries cannot be cumulated with the injury caused by imports from the

country

141
.

In practice, the

available under the

new

first

Commission has occasionally cumulated products which were

subjected to different investigations

B.

same kind of

142
.

Therefore, the past

EC

practice will

no longer be

Regulation.

PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF THE NEW REGULATION

140

Synthetic Fibers of Polyester (Mexico, Romania, Turkey, Taiwan,

USA, Yugoslavia)

1988 O.J. (L151) 47; See also Tungsten Carbide (China, Republic of Korea) 1990 O.J.(

L83) 36; Audio Tapes in Cassettes (Japan, Hong Kong, Republic of Korea) 1990 O.J.
(LI 19) 35; Dihydrostreptomycin (Japan, China) 1991 O.J. (L187) 23; Cotton Yarn
(Brazil, Egypt, Turkey, India, Thailand) 1991 O.J.
141

Vulmust and Waer, supra note

(L271)

17.

57, at 62.

142

Vulmust and Waer, supra note

Weighing Scales
(LI 12) 20; Certain Electronic Weighing

85, at 15; see also Certain Electronic

(Singapore, Republic of Korea) 1993 O.J.
Scales (Japan) 1993 O.J. (LI 04) 4.

35

1

REIMBURSEMENT OF DUTY

.

Since the anti-dumping duty
not exceed real

is

intended to have a compensatory effect,

143
Thus, EC anti-dumping
dumping margins
.

it

should

regulations have provided a

refund procedure for anti-dumping duties exceeding actual dumping margins. The

URAA

provides two important modifications in reimbursement of anti-dumping duties and the

new Regulation reproduces

(a)

those changes with

some

deviations.

Deduction of Anti-Dumping Duties as a Cost

The

URAA sets out a notable provision with respect to treatment of anti-dumping

duties in reconstructing the export price.

It

requires the national authorities to take

account of any change in normal value, any change of costs incurred between importation

and

re-sale,

and any movement

selling prices,

dumping

in the re-sale price

duties paid

duly reflected in subsequent

when conclusive evidence of the above

duties as a cost

which made

the overimposed anti-dumping duties.
practice in

is

and to calculate the export price with no deduction for the amount of anti-

This change seems to be aimed

dumping

which

Minebea case 145

.

at the

it

EC

is

provided

144
.

authorities' practice to deduct anti-

almost impossible for related importers to refund

The Court of Justice condoned

In the contested decisions

146
,

the

the

Commission's

Commission

rejected the

143

See Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro delivered on 2 1 March

1

99 1 Report of cases,
.

1992, pages 1-1689.
144

Article 9.3.3,

URAA,

supra note 20.

145

Case

c- 188/88,

NMB (Deutschland) GmbH., NMB (Italia) Sri., NMB (U.K) Limited, v.

Commission 1992E.C.R. 1689.
146

Commission Decision 88/327/EEC, 88/328/EEC, 88/329/EEC of 22 April 1988
concerning applications for refund of anti-dumping duties collected on certain imports of

36
refund applications by the importers. According to the Commission's reasoning,
not be justified to grant refunds to related importers

who

it

could

took only a single jump,

because those reimbursements would increase the risk of disguised dumping by the
related importers

the

and would bring up discrimination of independent imports

Commission's understanding contains a couple of illogical

disguised

dumping has nothing

price increase

would

to

is

the

be, the importer will

amount of the hidden

dumping remains exactly

.

However,

aspects. First, the risk of

do with the double jump requirement. Whatever the
have the same opportunity to give a disguised

discount to his or her customers so as to allow them to
difference

147

sell at

dumped

prices

148
.

The only

discounts. Therefore, the risk of disguised

the same. Second, with regard to the discrimination, the

Commission's view could be sustained only where independent importers who have
purchased goods
increase onto

its

at

an increased price, paid the anti-dumping duty and passed the double

customer

in full

149
.

However,

if

independent importers pass only a

proportion of the increase in the export price to the resale price, the result would be
discriminatory to related importers because related importers cannot bear the burden of
the anti-dumping duties without prejudicing the right to obtain refunds

150
.

Contrary to the

Commission's explanation, the double jump requirement generates an unfair consequence
for related importers

by

restricting their price policy,

shares. Nevertheless, the Court

which

is

crucial to

keep

certain ballbearings originating in Singapore, 1988 O.J. (LI 48) 26,28,31.

]4

See

id.

*See Opinion of Advocate General Tesauro, supra note 143.

mSee

id.

mSee

id.

market

of Justice upheld the Commission's practice by saying

that;

XA1

their

37

As

Commission

the

correctly pointed out, the only difference

between the

GATT Anti-Dumping Code and the Community Regulation with respect to the
construction of the export price

is that,

principle that allowance should be

and

resale, "including duties

certain duties

and other

must be made.

It

Under the

URAA,

clarifies that

made

for costs incurred

costs, including
is

anti-dumping duties, for which allowance

no inconsistency between the basic

Anti-Dumping Code 151

.

the reasoning of the Court of Justice

new Regulation

they are not identical. While the

prices
users.

153
.

evidence that the duty

is

152
,

new

the

Regulation mentions only one

duly reflected in resale prices and subsequent selling

EC

154
.

As

could negate the effort in the

See supra,

p. 34.

153

New Regulation, supra note

154

Vulmust and Waer, supra note

16, art. 11 (10).

57, at 68.

EC

a result, the partial

URAA because

it

implies that the

impose a heavier burden of proof which requires the related importers

See case c-1 88/88, supra note 145.

lS2

URAA but

URAA provides three situations which must be taken

to maintain the consistent price pattern

implementation by the

]S]

cost.

Thus, in order to take advantage of the provision, sales subsidiaries in the

will

it

This provision seems to emphasize the price consistency from importers to end

would have

EC

no longer persuasive since

incorporates the changes in the

into account in re-constructing the export price
situation,

is

anti-dumping duties should not be deducted as a

Article 11 (10) of the

between importation

and taxes", the Community Regulation specifies

follows that there

regulation and the

whereas the Code merely lays down the

to provide

38
evidence of the price consistency even by dealers and end users whose prices are not
controlled by the related importers

(b) Target Deadlines in

The

155
.

Refund Proceedings

URAA introduces a couple of

important time limits in proceedings

concerning the refunds of anti-dumping duties. Article

9. 3.

2 of the

URAA provides that

refunds for anti-dumping duties shall normally take place within twelve months, and in

no case more than eighteen months,

after the date

on which a request

for a refund has

been made by an importer of the product subject to the anti-dumping duty

156
.

It

provides that the actual payment of the authorized refunds should normally be
within ninety days of the reimbursement decision
Article
alteration.

1 1

of the

(8) (c)

new Regulation

.

incorporates those time limits without

to speed-up the refund proceedings,

years to complete

158
.

Moreover, Article

1 1

made

157

Even though the provision contains some

Commission

further

flexibility,

it

will require the

which has usually taken two or three

(8) (a) provides that a refund request

may be

lodged within six months of the date on which the amount of definitive duties to be levied

was duly determined by

the authorities or of the date

definitively to collect the

on which a decision was made

amounts secured by way of provisional duty. The

URAA does

155

How the GATT Became Protectionist, An Analysis

of the Uruguay
Round Draft Final Anti-Dumping Code, 27 Journal of World Trade (Law-EconomicsPublic Policy) October 1993, 5-17, at 8.
See Gary N. Horlick,

156

URAA, supra note

20, art 9.3.2.

]51

Id.
158

Vulmust and Waer, supra note

79, at 85; see also Vinyl Acetate

O.J. (L80) 53; Hydraulic Excavators (Japan)

1987 0.J. (L102)25.

Monomer (USA)

1991

1989 O.J.(L108) 17; Polyester Yarn (USA)

39
not contain a similar provision.
results

It

seems probable

that the extension

from Commission recognition of criticism of the

EC

of the lodging period

past refund procedure

159
.

This

change will give importers more time to consider the refundability and prepare the
information required by Article

import transactions

2.

1 1

(8) (b).

It

will also allow importers to pool

more

160
.

SAMPLING
Article 17 of the

new

Regulation provides that in cases where the number of

complaints, exporters or importers, types of product or transactions are large, the
investigation

may be

limited to a reasonable

by using samples which

number of parties, products or

are statistically valid

transactions

on the basis of information available

at the

time of selection, or to the largest representative volume of production, sales or exports

which can reasonably be investigated within the time available

161
.

This

a far

is

more

thorough rule than Regulation 2423/88, which merely puts the sampling techniques as

one of the alternative methods for the establishment of normal values

Commission

162
.

However, the

interpreted the scope of the sampling techniques quite broadly in

its

actual

application. For instance, in Bicycles, a exporter claimed that the use of production
sales data led to the flawed

sample because sales and production trends were also the

basis for the injury determination
entitled to use a

Vulmust and Waer, supra note

161

162

163

id. at

163
.

The Council concluded

57, at 67.

68.

New Regulation, supra note

16, art. 17(1).

Council Regulation 2423/88, supra note 15,
Bicycle

(

that the

Commission was

sampling technique which yielded a representative selection of

159

mSee

and

Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand

)

art.

2 (13).

1996 O.J.

(

L91)

1.

40

community producers

164
.

In

its

reasoning, the Council agreed that Regulation 2423/88 did
165

not provide for the use of sampling techniques for the purpose of injury determination

However,

it

also noted that, since Regulation 2423/88 did not require the

investigate each complaining

Community producer

either, the

.

Commission

to

Commission's usage of the

sampling technique in determination of injury was not against Regulation 2423/88

166
.

The

reasoning seems hard to escape from the criticism in that the Council's reasoning came
out of another discretionary interpretation because

From

this point

it

rested

on a simple

circular argument.

of view, Article 17(1) of the new Regulation will provide more

understandable legal bases for the Commission's usage of the sampling technique.
Article 17 (2) authorizes the
parties, types

Commission

of products or transactions'

67
.

to use ultimate

However, preference

choosing a sample in consultation with, and with the consent
provided that such parties make themselves
available, within three

chosen

168
.

weeks of initiation,

Besides, this provision

place at the stage where

response

169
.

it

is

shall

concerned,

sufficient information

sample to be

to imply that the sampling will already take

past practice has added pressure to exporters and

Commission took

the position that

all

foreign producers and

exporters should respond to the questionnaire to be treated as co-operating parties and

mSee
]65

id.

See

id.

l66

167

>

id.

See

6&

Article 17 (2), Council Regulation 3283/94, supra note 16.

See

l69

id.

Vulmust and Waer, supra note 49,

at 65.

of

be given to

of, the parties

to enable a representative

would seem

in the selection

decided which parties should complete the questionnaire

The Commission's

producers. In the past, the

known and make

power

41

sampling would only be considered
questionnaires have
time, because the

at the stage

become more and more

Commission

in the questionnaires, instead

requires

of verification

difficult to

more and more

170
.

The EC anti-dumping

respond to within designated
related evidence to be presented

of relying on on-the-spot-verification for a detailed

examination of the data obtained by the parties concerned

171
.

As

a result, the earlier

of sampling procedure will free unselected exporters and producers from a

initiation

onerous burden and seems to be a reasonable alternative because

form unselected exporters and producers has not been used
Article 17 (3) codified a

at

any

rate,

at later stage

Commission's practice concerning the

responses

172
.

right to individual

treatment in sampling situations. Requests for individual treatments have been
frequently by exporters from non-market

expressed

its

view with respect

Commission considered

economy

to the nature

countries. In Bicycle, the

made

Commission

of the right to individual treatment

the individual treatment as a limited right

173
.

The

which could be

granted only where the individual treatment could give a more proportionate and effective

remedy against
view was

injurious

that the

EC

dumping than

anti-dumping regulation aimed

which the duty was imposed

mSee

id., at

a single country-wide duty
at the

174
.

The

basis for the

country and the product on

as the subject matter in the regulation

175
.

65.

171

Ivo
(

,72

173

Van

EEC Anti-Dumping Law and Procedure Revisited,

Law-Economics-Public Policy

Vulmust and Waer, supra note
Bicycle

mSee
il5

Bael,

See

id.

id.

(

),

April 1990, at 17.

57, at 65.

the People's Republic of China

)

1993 O.J. (228)

1.

Journal of World Trade

42

The new

provision, in conformity with the

Commission's said view, gives

exporters and producers a limited right to individual treatment.

It

where sampling has taken place, individual margins of dumping
producers and exporters not

initially selected

the time limits provided for in the

new

provides that in cases

shall be calculated for

which submit necessary information within

Regulation, except where co-operating producers

and exporters are so large that the individual treatment would be unduly burdensome and
prevent the timely completion of the investigation

176
.

In practice, the

Commission has

granted an individual treatment on the basis of the same reasoning as in the
provision

177
.

Article

1

7 (4) sets out the best-information-available rule in case of a material

degree of continuing non-co-operation
there

is

sufficient time to

to domestic

3.

new

do so

179
.

178
.

However, a new sample may be selected when

This provision seems reasonable as long as

and foreign producers equally 180

it

applies

.

ANTI-ABSORPTION
Anti-absorption duties are imposed where exporters have absorbed anti-dumping

duties.

Even though

neither the anti-dumping

Agreements nor Article VI of GATT has

provided that the importers actually bear anti-dumping duties, the

176

New Regulation, supra note

EC

has allowed the

16, art. 13 (3).

177
) 1994 O.J. ( L320 ) l("As individual consideration of
was not unduly burdensome and did not delay the
the Commission investigated these three companies separately.").

Certain Polyester Yarns

(

India

these three Indian producers
investigation,
178

New Regulation, supra note

m

16, art. 17 (4).

Id.

180

Vulmust and Waer, supra note

57, at 65.

43

Community

authorities to

impose so-called anti-absorption duties since the introduction

of Article 13(10) of Regulation 2423/88

m
.

The amount of absorption of anti-dumping

duty has been calculated on the basis of the difference between the import price of the

product concerned during the period of the

initial

investigation and the import price

during the period following imposition of a provisional anti-dumping duty

182
.

Those

relevant import prices could be obtained on the basis of customs statistics. In calculation

of the amount of anti-absorption duties, the Commission has examined some of the
related factors; such as quality
in

raw material

prices,

of products, market trends, currency fluctuation, changes

which could have influenced the fluctuation of import prices

imposition of original anti-dumping duties

183

after

However, the Commission has not

.

considered any changes of the normal value in calculating the amount of absorbed

duty

184

In other words, the fact that import prices

.

the original anti-dumping duty

anti-dumping duties.

It

was regarded

seems quite

have not increased by the amount of

as the absolute evidence of the absorption of

illogical to assess

regard to the normal value; because, the normal value

an anti-dumping duty without
is

a prerequisite element in

calculation of an anti-dumping duty.
In response to the criticism, the
in Article 12.

m See id,

It

new Regulation

introduces two modified features

provides that the dumping margins must be recalculated before anti-

at 69.

182

See, for example, Silicon Metal

Woven

mSee

Polyolefin Sacks

(

(

the People's Republic of China

the People's Republic of China

)

)

1992 O.J.

1993 O.J.

(

L215

L170

(

) 1;

) 1.

id.

184

See Creally, supra note

Community

6, at 98.

The former

article

authorities did not intent to look

importer, thereby ignoring normal value.

at the

was

drafted in such terms that the

exporter's position, merely that of the

44
absorption duties are imposed
the

Community

185

Besides, in contrast to the former provision,

.

authorities to take into account the changes in the

it

requires

normal values

Therefore, the legality controversy over the methodology used to calculate

186
.

amount of

absorption of anti-dumping duties will no longer be a source of exporters' argument.

Moreover, the Explanatory

Memorandum now

will not be treated as a cost in the construction

provided that the duty

is

in the

Community 187

.

is

clarifies that

anti-dumping duties

of export prices when conclusive evidence

duly reflected in resale prices and the subsequent selling prices

In other words, the concept of the duty as a non-cost applies to the

method of the construction of the export

price in the anti-absorption procedure

188
.

Generally speaking, those changes will improve the transparency in the anti-absorption

proceedings and provide

However,

much

fairer bases for the

in anti-absorption cases,

amount of the anti-absorption

where an anti-absorption investigation

may be made subject to

involves a re-examination of normal values, imports

pending the outcome of the investigation
the registration requirement

Commission 190

185

is

187

.

This provision

is

clearly discriminatory since

not applicable to normal interim reviews carried out by the

16, art. 12 (2).

12(5).

Vulmust and Waer, supra note

mSee,

189

registration

.

New Regulation, supra note

mId. Art.

duties.

Explanatory
In

57, at 69.

Memorandum, supra

common with the

note 58, at

6.

refund provisions, duties cannot, in contrast to the

position now, be treated as a cost incurred between importation and resale in cases

of a re-construction of export prices, where measures have impacted on prices or

where there

is

legitimate reason

why prices have

measures.
189

New Regulation, supra note

16, art. 12 (5).

mSee Van Bael, supra note 64, at 244.

not increased following the

45

4.

REGISTRATION OF IMPORTS
The

URAA allows national authorities to withhold the appraisement of imports in

three situations.

undertaking

is

The

circumstance

first

is

violated, definitive duties

the violation of an undertaking. If an

may

be levied in accordance with the

URAA on

products entered for consumption not more than 90 days before the application of such
provisional measures

191
.

However, such

retroactive assessment cannot apply to imports

entered before the violation of the undertaking

proceedings for

new

192
.

The next

situation

is

the review

comers. If a product, subject to anti-dumping duties,

the unrelated exporters or producers, the authorities

is

imported by

must promptly carry out a review

for

the purpose of determining individual margins of dumping for the exporters or producers
in question

193

may withhold

In such cases, the authorities

.

appraisement and/or request

guarantees to ensure that anti-dumping duties can be levied retroactively to the date of the
initiation

of the review

retroactively for not

194
.

more

that

90 days prior to the date of application of provisional

measures, where the two conditions are met
history of dumping

known

191

URAA

,

195
.

One

condition

injury or the importer
196
.

is

that there should be a

knew, or should have previously

And the second

condition pertains to the

by massive imports of the product which seriously undermine the remedial

supra note 20,

mId.
m Id

which cause

the existence of dumping and injury

injury caused

anti-dumping duty can be levied

Finally, a definitive

art. 9.5.

mId.
m Id.

art. 10.6.

mId.

art.

10.6(1).

art.

8.6

46
of the definitive anti-dumping duty

effect

appraisement as

may

197
.

In such cases, the authorities

may

be necessary to retroactively collect anti-dumping duties'

The EC's new Regulation
procedure in Article 14

(5). It

sets out general guidelines

withhold
98
.

about the registration

provides that the Commission, after consultation with the

Anti-Dumping Committee,

direct the

customs authorities to take the appropriate steps to

register imports, so that the

measures

may

from the date of such registration

199
.

It

subsequently be applied against those imports

also provides that registration should be

introduced by a form of regulation which contains the purpose of the registration and the
estimated amount of future
nine months

200
.

liability,

and

that the period

of registration cannot exceed

This provision seems to comply with the counterpart of the

However, the new Regulation widened the scope of the

new

Regulation, contrary to the

URAA,

review, the

retroactivity.

there are five situations in

201

authorities applies duties retroactively

.

In cases

new Regulation reproduced the

URAA.
Under

the

which the Community

of massive dumping and the newcomer

provisions of the

URAA 202

.

However, the new

Regulation permits the registration of imports in case of withdrawal from undertaking,

which

is

inconsistent with the

URAA in that the URAA allows the withholding of

appraisement only in the violation of undertakings

203
.

Furthermore, even though there are

no provisions on anti-circumvention and anti-absorption, the new Regulation added the

w

Id. art.

mId.
199

art.

10.6(H).

10.7.

New Regulation, supra note

200

Id.

201

Vulmust and Waer, supra note

202

New Regulation, supra note

203

16, art. 14 (5).

Id. art.

10(5).

57, at 70.

16, art. 10 (4)

and

1 1

(4) (b).

47

two

situations in the range

of the registration procedure. Article 12 (5) of the new

Regulation provides that imports

may

be subject to registration

investigations involving a re-examination of normal values.

cases of anti-absorption

in

And, Article 13

(3) also

requires registration of imports in anti-circumvention proceedings. Consequently, if the
registration provisions with respect to anti-circumvention
in concrete cases, there

5.

would possibly be

UNDERTAKINGS
Article 8.3 of the

be accepted

WTO challenge in near future

204
.

.

URAA provides that undertakings offered by exporters need not

if the authorities

number of actual

a

and anti-absorption are applied

consider their acceptance impractical; for example, if the

or potential exporters

is

too great, or for other reasons, including

reasons of general policy.

The new Regulation reproduced

Community

authorities

the provision in Article 8 (3). In practice, the

have enjoyed wide discretion

undertakings offered by exporters
rejection of undertakings has

205
.

in accepting or rejecting

The Commission's

been expressed

in various

discretion with respect to the

forms

206
.

For example,

in

Mechanical Alarm Clocks, the Commission stated that the conditions of the undertaking
offered

would not permit adequate monitoring of compliance with the terms of the
207

undertaking

.

And

in Hardboard, the

Commission
208

ground of the breach of a previous undertaking

204

Vulmust and Waer, supra note

205

See

Van Bael

&

Bellis,

.

rejected the undertaking

Besides, in Vinyl Acetate

57, at 71

supra note

8,

at 98.

206

Seeid. at 99-100.

207

208

Mechanical Alarm Clocks

Hardboard

(

(

GDR, USSR ) 1980

Czechoslovakia, Poland, Sweden

)

O.J. (L344) 34.

1983 O.J. (L361)

6.

on the

Monomer,

48
the non-existence under Canadian legislation of the possibility of terminating an anti-

dumping proceeding by accepting an undertaking was
rejection

209

Compared

.

undertaking system?

It

to the past practice,

seems probable

how

a ground for the

will the

new

provision affect the future

that the fact that undertakings can be rejected

the basis of the reasons of general policy will give the

Community

authorities even

discretion in deciding the practicability of undertakings. This change

opposition of the main trend of the

more

specific

and

Commission's

URAA;

seems

in that, generally speaking,

it

on

more

to be in

should give

less discretionary rules.

Article 8 (3) of the

new

Regulation

now requires the Community

authorities to

provide for the exporter the reasons which have led them to consider acceptance of an
undertaking as inappropriate

Community
exporters

211
.

210
.

According to the past practice,

it

was very

rare that the

authorities published the reasons for rejecting an undertaking offered

This change

is

by

expected to enhance the transparency in accepting or rejecting

undertakings and give the future undertakers useful data for a successful offer of an
undertaking.
Article 8 (4) imposes a

new

obligation

upon

parties offering an undertaking.

Contrary to the past practice, the undertaking offerers
confidential version of the undertaking,

However, as the contents

Vinyl Acetate

210

See

212

Van Bael

Monomer (Canada

&

Bellis,

)

to interest parties

8,

URAA, supra note

at 99.

16, art. 8 (4).

Vulmust and Waer, supra note

is

quite doubtful

1984 OJ. (LI 70) 70.

16, art. 8 (3);

supra note

New Regulation, supra note

213

which can be made available

importance of the provision in actual cases

New Regulation, supra note

2u

provide a non212
.

in price undertakings is considered as a very confidential matter

in the business world, the

209

now must

57, at 66.

20,

art. 8.3.

213
.

49
6.

REVIEW FOR NEWCOMER
Article

procedures.
the

1 1

(4) provides a set

of new provisions with respect to newcomer review

The newcomer review has been developed by EC

URAA as a result of the Uruguay Round214
The

change occurred

first

practice and taken over in

.

new provision imposes

in this area is that the

a heavier

burden of proof for being considered a newcomer to exporters asking for the review.

According to past practices, the exporters were required to show
exported the products concerned to the

were not related

period, that they

to,

Community during the

that they

had not

original investigation

or associated with, any of the companies subject to

the anti-dumping duty and that they started such exports after the original investigation

period or had a firm intention of doing so

215
.

The new Regulation tightened the

third

requirement by requiring the exporters to show either that they have actually exported to
the

Community

in the investigation period or that they

have entered into an irrevocable

216

contractual obligation to export a significant quantity

Furthermore, the

new

.

Regulation incorporates an important improvement in the

URAA that no anti-dumping duty shall apply as long as the review is in progress 217

2

"ld. at 67. Article 9.5

of the

.

It

URAA provides that:

[S]uch a review shall be initiated and carried put in an accelerated basis,

compared
country.

normal duty assessment and review proceedings

to

No

in the

importing

anti-dumping duties shall be levied on imports from such exporters or

producers while the review

is

being carried out. The authorities may, however,

withhold appraisement and/or request guarantees to ensure

review result

in determination

of dumping

in respect

that,

should such a

of such producers or

exporters, anti-dumping duties can be levied retroactively to the date of the
initiation
2]5

216

217

of the review.

See,for example, Certain Polyester Yarn

New Regulation, supra note

16, art.

Vulmust and Waer, supra note

1 1

(

India

(4) (a).,

57, at 67.

)

1994 O.J.

(

L320

) 1.

50
provides that the Commission Regulation initiating a review shall repeal the duty
for the

newcomer by amending

the Regulation

in force

which imposed the anti-dumping duty218

.

However, the temporary exemption from the anti-dumping duty does not exclude the
possibility

of retroactive anti-dumping duties on the products imported during the

investigation period of newcomer review.

newcomer

The Commission

shall

subject to registration by the Regulation initiating the

make imports of the
newcomer review

in

order to ensure that anti-dumping duties can be applied retroactively to the date of the
initiation

of the newcomer review

Article
will not apply

1 1

219
.

(4) (c) provides that the provisions concerning the

where duties have been imposed under Article 9

(6)

newcomer review

which

sets out rules

imposition of anti-dumping duties by the sampling techniques. In contrast, there
counterpart in the
the

URAA.

7.

Thus, this unilateral limitation seems likely to be challenged in

220
.

NEW STANDING REQUIREMENT
Article 5 (4) provides that an investigation shall not be initiated unless

determined, on the basis of an examination of the degree of support
the complaint expressed

by Community producers of the

complaint has been made by or on behalf of the
defines that in order to be considered to be

New Regulation, supra note
See

220

16, art.

1 1

Vulmust and Waer, supra note

57, at 67.

has been

or opposition to,

industry.

And

'by or on behalf of the

it

further

Community

by those Community producers whose

(4) (b).

id.

for,

it

like product, in that the

Community

made

industry', the complaint should be supported

2i9

no

WTO if the Commission were to actually refuse to initiate newcomer reviews in such

circumstances

2,8

is

of

51

collective output constitutes

more than 50% of the

total

production of the like product

produced by that portion of the Community industry expressing either support
opposition to the complaint

Community producers
total

221

However, no investigation

.

are an exact reproduction of Article 5.4 of the

some U.S.

clarifies the definition

On the
Commission's
initiate

the

be initiated

when

expressly supporting the complaint account for less than

production of the like product produced by the

standing problems in

shall

for or

cases

223
.

It

Community

222

industry

.

25%

of

These rules

URAA which is presumably inspired by

seems

to be a proper

development

in that

it

of major proportion of the Community industry.

other hand, Article 5 (4) could be a quite burdensome requirement on the
side.

For instance, the Commission

required to decide whether

is

224

proceedings or not within 45 days of the lodging of the complaint

Commission must

finish the

.

it

will

Therefore,

examination of the standing requirement and the

determination of de minimis market-share within such a limited period. Consequently, the

new

standing requirement will exert pressure on the

complicated standing issues

8.

Commission

in cases involving

225
.

SUSPENSION OF ANTI-DUMPING DUTIES
Anti-dumping duties may be suspended

for a period

of nine months by

Commission decision where market conditions have temporarily changed
that injury

221

would be unlikely

to

New Regulation, supra note

resume as a

16, art. 5 (4).

222

Id.

223

Vulmust and Waer, supra note

224

New Regulation, supra note

225

Vulmust and Waer, supra note

85, at 16.

16, art. 5 (9).

57, at 64.

result

to the extent

of the suspension, and provided that

.

52

Community

the

industry has been given an opportunity to

have been taken into account
industry the right to veto a
that is the case,

it

226
.

It

would be an arguable

Commission proposal

seems hard

to avoid an

to

comment and

if

it

gives the

these

comments

Community

suspend the anti-dumping duties.

argument over protectionism.

suspension measure can be extended for a period of a

maximum

And

of one year

Council so decides, by simple majority, on a proposal from the Commission

If

the
if the
227
.

To

date,

the suspension of anti-dumping measures has been targeting products having cyclical

market characteristics, such as

DRAMs 228 (dynamic random access memories) and

EPROMs 229 (erasable programmable read only memories).

It

appears to be a proper

application of the suspension measure because the cyclical characteristic of those

products needs

some temporary, not permanent measures.

may at any time

C.

if the

reason for the suspension

is

measures

no longer applicable

230

NEW ANTI-CIRCUMVENTION MEASURE

1.

226

be re-instated

Finally, anti-dumping

EFFORTS DURING THE URUGUAY ROUND

New Regulation, supra note

16, art. 14 (4).

221

Id.
228

Dynamic Random Access Memories

(Japan, the Republic of Korea) 1995 O.J. (LI 26)

58.
229

Erasable Programmable Read Only Memories (Japan) 1995 O.J. (LI 65) 26.

230

New Regulation, supra note

16, art. 14 (4).

.

53

The inclusion of new and

effective anti-circumvention measures in the

was one of the key objectives of the

EC

Round 231

during the Uruguay

the anti-circumvention negotiation during the

Uruguay Round was

A

.

URAA

major issue

to clarify

in

what kinds

of circumstances were enough to justify the application of anti-circumvention measures

to

imported parts or to products assembled with such parts in a third country without
proceeding

full

procedure for the imposition of anti-dumping duties

provided several provisions concerning the measures

233
.

232

The Dunkel Draft

.

For example, Article 10 and 12

of the Dunkel Draft provided several rules for different kinds of circumvention. Article
10.4 dealt with 'country hopping', a situation

order issued by a country resumes
234

country to the same country
authorities to

.

dumping through

In case

a related

of country hopping, the

impose anti-dumping duties retroactively up to

the initial suspension of liquidation
in

where a company subject

235
.

1

company
article

anti-dumping

located in another

allowed the

50 days prior to the date of

Article 10.5 provided another circumvention case

which an anti-dumping order could be imposed retroactively

country hopping cases.

to a

for the

same period

as in

A third country assembly was the subject matter in this provision.

231

See Simon Holmes, Anti-Circumvention under the European Union

Dumping Rules,
n3
232

's

New Anti-

Journal of World Trade (Law-Economics-Public Policy), June 1995 29

at 164.

See Leebron, supra note 18,

at 20.

233

See Holmes, supra note 231,

n. 11. the

Dunkel

text

was a

draft

anti-dumping code

December 1991 by the Director-General of the GATT, Arthur Dunkel. This
was intended to represent a compromise which could be adopted by all parties.
produced

in

234

See William D. Hunter, Key provisions of the "Dunkel Drafts " on Anti-dumping and
Subsidies and Countervailing Duties( PLI Corp. L. & Practice Course Handbook Series

No.B4-7013, 1992).
2i5

See

id.

54
For example,

if a

company

country A, subject to an anti-dumping order issued by

in

country B, assembled the products with parts originating in Country

through a related company and exported the products to country B,
case dealt under article 10.5 of the Dunkel Draft

236
.

As

to the

A

it

in a third

would

assembling

in

constitute a

importing

countries, Article 12 required that the cost of the imported parts not be less than

the total cost of all parts

and

that the value

importing country shall not exceed

25%

added by the assembly operation

country

70%

of

in the
237

of the ex-factory cost of the finished product

.

Despite the fact that anti-circumvention was one of the major issues fiercely

debated during the Uruguay Round, the matter was not shown in the
draft anti-circumvention provisions included in the

various exporting countries
this matter

under

2.

238
.

However, the

Dunkel Draft were opposed by

parties agreed to continue discussions

and

has been referred to the Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices established

URAA 239

.

BRIEF HISTORY OF THE EC ANTI-CIRCUMVENTION

On

URAA because the

MEASURE

22 June, 1987, the Council of the European Community adopted a regulation

which amended the European Community's Anti-dumping laws 240 The so-called
.

Screwdriver Regulation extended the scope of anti-dumping duties to products which had

been assembled

in the

Community provided

that they

met

certain criteria.

The

principal

236

Id.

™Id.
23s

2y)

See

Van

See

id.

Bael, supra note 64,

at

243.

240

Protection Against

Dumped

or Subsidized Imports, Council Regulation No. 1761/87,

1987 O.J. (LI 67) 9 (hereinafter Screwdriver Regulation).

55
stimulus to the enactment of the Screwdriver Regulation

was

the vulnerable provisions

regarding assessment and enforcement of anti-dumping regulations which could have
241

been evaded easily
the

Community was

who went
the
all

first

.

The extension of the anti-dumping laws

to products

assembled

in

generally understood as a counteraction against Japanese companies

through loopholes in the Community's anti-dumping regulation. The fact that

four anti-dumping investigations initiated under the Screwdriver Regulation were

targeted Japanese companies supported the said

242

view

.

In fact, the concern over the

ineffectiveness of anti-dumping regulations in circumvention areas had been enlarged in
the

European Community over the past years before the enactment of the Screwdriver

Regulation.
the

The circumvention of anti-dumping

European Community

industries

243

in

duties

became

a

more

serious problem in

connection with declining competitiveness of European

During early 1980s, Japanese companies began to expand production

.

European Community

facilities in the

barriers to Japanese products

244
.

to

overcome the

For example,

in areas

relatively high tariff and non-tariff

of photocopiers, where the

241

McDermott, Extending the reach of their anti-dumping laws The
European Community's "Screwdriver Assembly" Regulation, 20 Law & Policy in
See Patrick

J.

:

International Business 315.
242

See

id.

nn. 4

&

5.

Investigations of Japanese companies manufacturing electronic

typewriters and electronic weighing scales were opened in September,

company making

hydraulic excavators

was

targeted in October, 1987.

1

987, and a

A fourth

companies producing photocopiers, was announced in
two investigations were announced by the Commission on

investigation, of Japanese

February, 1988.

The

first

Community producers. Electronic
1987 O.J. (C235) 3, and Electronic Typewriters, 1987 O.J. (C235) 2. The third
investigation was announced by the Commission on October 23, 1987. Hydraulic
September

1,

1987, following complaints from

Excavators, 1987 O.J. (C285)
243

244

See id,

See

id.

at 316.

4.

The

fourth, Photocopiers,

1988 O.J. (C44)

3.

Scales,

56
Japanese had achieved a dominant market position in the world market including the

European Community, almost
set

up new

facilities or

all

the Japanese photocopier producers
245

expand existing capacity

Japanese producers, the

.

In response to the

Community producers complained

were planning

to

movements by

the

that these expansions

and

investments by the Japanese producers were an effort to circumvent anti-dumping duties

and would give very
the

favorable influence to job market and technical development in

little

246

European Community

.

In such a circumstance, the

Economic Relations of the European Parliament released

Committee on External
a report

on

3 July, 1986,

encouraging the Commission and the Council to take steps to anti-circumvention

measures

247
.

Then, the Commission submitted a proposal for a Council Regulation. The

proposal was adopted by the Council on 22 June, 1987 with several amendments. This

has been called the 'Screwdriver Regulation' because the goal of the Regulation was to
protect the

Community

industries

from foreign manufacturers

who had evaded

dumping measures by simple screwdriver assembly techniques

3.

duties

on products assembled or produced

were met

246

241

Seeid.

See

id.

See

id.

249
.

at

318.

™Seeid.z\2>\5.
249

See

Community248

.

SCREWDRIVER REGULATION
The Screwdriver Regulation allowed

245

in the

anti-

id. at

320.

the

in the

Commission

to assess

European Community

anti-dumping
if three

conditions

57
First,

exporter

the assembler or producer must be related to or associated with a foreign

whose products

250

are subject to a definitive anti-dumping duty

the Screwdriver Regulation did not provide detailed guideline,

kind of relationship had to exist between the party
production in the

Community and

anti-dumping duty

251
.

the manufacturer

industry,

252
.

companies could be considered

whose exports were

According to the

when both were jointly

to be related

controlled or controlled

by a

what

clear as to

carrying out the assembly or
subject to an

was conceived

as a

GATT Understanding,

1982 about the definition of related party

in

was not

it

Generally, the definition for a related party

corporate relationship between two parties

which was reached

who was

However, since

.

in

when one

determining domestic

controlled the other; or

third party, provided that there

were

grounds for believing that the effect of the relationship was enough to cause the domestic
producers to behave differently from other domestic producers

On the

other hand, the

meaning of the associated

definition than the concept of the related parties,

of a corporate relationship

254
.

The

parties contained a

definition of the associated party

Council Regulation 2176/84, supra note 12,

not related

much

253

broader

art.

255
.

was considered

The Commission proposal

13 (10)

to

for

(a).

251

Gerwin Van Gerven,

New Anti-Circumvention

Rules in

EEC Anti-Dumping Law,

International Lawyer, Fall 1988, at 817.
252

Seeid.

253

See

id.

See

id.

See

id.

254

255

at

818.

n. 46. In

.

which could reach beyond the existence

cover a contractual agreement between two parties

250

who were

Nachi Fujikoshi Corp. V. Council, the Court of Justice stated

that:

[U]ndertakings which are associated in business means not only
undertakings which, under the legislation governing limited companies or groups

of companies, are interconnected, but those which maintain other contractual or

58
adoption of the Screwdriver Regulation did not mention the concept of the associated
256

party

.

The reason

added the concept of the associated party seemed

that the Council

to

have been indicated that anti-circumvention measures were not only feasible when one
party

was

parties

257
.

directly or indirectly controlled

In Electronic Scales, the

subsidiary of TEC (Japan) and that

economic and commercial
justification

Silver

was based on

by the other party but also between independent

Commission found
TEC-Keylard had

links with

TEC(Japan)

investigation because the assembly
259
.

The Commission

those of Silver Reed.
typewriters

It

TEC(UK)

Ltd.

was a

258

substantial capital links
In this case, the

.

and close

Commission's

the concept of corporate links. In Electronic Typewriters,

Reed International(Europe) Ltd contended

Europe Ltd

that

was not

that

it

carried out

should not be included in the

by Silver Reed but by Astec

held, however, that Astec

Europe Ltd. was

in essence

noted that Astec Europe Ltd simply assembled the parts of

which were delivered

to

its

premises by Silver Reed. Furthermore, these

assembled typewriters were exclusively sold on the Community market by the Silver

Reed Group which bore
finished product.

all

the costs between importation of parts and sales of the

The Regulation did not provide

a detailed guideline for those concepts.

Unlike Electronic Typewriters, the commission used the concept of the associated party
for the determination

of the degree of the relationship between the

parties.

As

non-contractual relationships which create a special link, regardless of the
relationships created
256

257

See

id.

See

id.

258

259

by the very

fact

of the purchase or sale transaction.

a\S\9

Electronic Scales (Japan) 1988 O.J. (LI 01)

1.

Electronic Typewriters (Japan) 1988 O.J. (LI 01) 4.

a result,

59
the first requirement could be satisfied by any kind of a business relationship between the
original

dumper and

the assembler.

Second, the assembly or production must have been started or substantially
increased after the opening of the anti-dumping investigation

260
.

In case that

assembly

production started or increased after the imposition of a definitive anti-dumping duty,
there

was a controversy concerning whether the anti-circumvention

considered as a

new procedure

or a review procedure

261
.

investigation

was

The wording of the Screwdriver

Regulation implied that the anti-circumvention investigation with regard to products

assembled or produced

in the

Community should be considered

Article 7 of Regulation 2 1 76/84

assembled

in the

Community

262
.

new procedure under

as a

Consequently, proceedings with regard to products

did not have any impact upon the duration of anti-dumping

measures with regard to the imported products and upon the sunset clause under Article
15 of Regulation 2176/84.

And

also, a

complainant did not need to follow the one year

lapse requirement for a request for investigation,

which otherwise would have been

required in review procedures.
Third, the value of parts and materials from the exporting country subject to the

duty must exceed the value of all other parts or materials by

words, a product assembled or produced in the

dumping duty

260

261

if the

50% 263

Community could be

.

In other

subject to an anti-

value of the parts and materials originating in the country of

Council Regulation 2176/84, supra note 12,
See, Gerwin,

at least

supra note 251,

at

art.

13 (10)

(a).

821.

262

See

Id.

Indeed, the

first

four anti-circumvention cases were considered as

new

procedures. See, Electronic Typewriters (Japan) 1988 O.J. (L101) 4; Electronic Scales
(Japan) 1988 O.J. (LI 01)

1;

Plain Paper Photocopiers (Japan) 1988 O.J. (L284) 60; Dot

Matrix Printers (Japan) 1989 O.J. (L291) 52.
263

Council Regulation 2176/84, supra note 12,

art.

13 (10)

(a).

60
exportation of the products subject to the anti-dumping duty were
total

more than 60% of the

value of all parts and materials used in the production. This provision in the

Screwdriver Regulation differed form the Commission Proposal
Screwdriver Regulation softened the

approximately

55%

of the

member

who

specialized in

states

activities

265
.

total

value

minimum
264
.

in

low cost assembly and

points. First, the

The Proposal required

part requirement.

The reason seemed

two

to protect certain

Community

their foreign investment

Second, while the Proposal dealt with only the simple ratio of foreign to

domestic components, the Screwdriver Regulation provided a statutory ground for the

Community
requirement

Institutions to take into account factors other than the 60/40 ratio
266
.

As

a result, if the products concerned involved high technological

development and employment
of the

minimum

effect, the
267

part requirement test

anti-circumvention assembly

2M

265

See,

was usually determined on

when

at

in those

the basis of the company's

delivered to the factories in the

into-factory duty paid basis

McDermott, supra note 241,

a exception regardless

The value of parts and materials used

.

purchase prices of the parts or materials

Community, namely on an

Community could make

268
.

However,

in Electronic

320.

/^.

266

Council Regulation 2176/84, supra note
account shall

13(10) (a).("In applying this provision,
be taken of the circumstances of each case, and, inter alia, of the variable
12, art.

costs incurred in the assembly or production operation

and of the research and
development carried out and the technology applied within the Community.").

267

See,

McDermott, supra note 241,

at

321.

268

See Creally, supra note

Dot Matrix

6, at 92;

see also Electronic Scales (Japan) 1988 O.J. (LI 01)

Printers (Japan) 1989 O.J. (L291) 52.

1;

61

Typewriters

269
,

some companies' purchase

prices

were not used since they did not

adequately reflect their true value. In this case, the sales prices were adjusted

in

order to

ensure that they reflected the companies' purchase prices of those parts manufactured by
third parties

on the

totality

of the companies'

expenses incurred by them and shown

own

production costs plus the

in their public

accounts

The Screwdriver Regulation was incorporated

SGA

270
.

into article 13(10)

of Regulation

2423/88. Later, Article 13(10) of Regulation 2423/88 was challenged in

GATT by the

Japanese government

271
.

In that case, the Panel noted that duties

products assembled in the
internal taxes

Article

EC

were contrary

to Article HI (2)

imposed by the

EC

on

of GATT which prohibits

which discriminate against imported products and were not justified under

XX (d).

It

further noted that undertakings given

use of Japanese parts were contrary to Article

III

(4)

by assembly plants

to limit the

of GATT which prohibits treating

imported products less favorably than domestic products. The EC's acceptance of the
ruling

was conditional upon a

of circumvention

272
.

satisfactory solution in the

As mentioned

earlier, since there

Uruguay Round

was no

solution in the

conditional acceptance does not have a practical meaning. However, the

not applied the provision after the

4.

problem

URAA,

the

Commission has

.

NEW ANTI-CIRCUMVENTION RULES

Electronic Scales (Japan) 1988
270

GATT ruling273

for the

See

O.J. (L101)

1.

id.

271

See

GATT Panel Report, EEC

Regulation on Imports of Parts and Components,

Document, L6657, 20 March 1990.
212

2n

See Holmes, supra note 231,
See

id.

at 164.

GATT

62

The new

EC

EC

refer the legality

The

EC

Regulation provides a set of

new

anti-circumvention provisions. The

of the new anti-circumvention rules to the Ministerial Declaration

interpreted the declaration as permitting individual

members

(a)

GATT

275
.

Non-Assembly Circumvention
Article 13 (1) of the

circumvention

276
.

new

Regulation covers virtually

all

forms of

Since this provision defines circumvention so generally, some liberal

Member

States

officials

suggested that this provision will not applied in cases of assembly operations in

opposed the adoption of the provision. In response, the Commission

either third countries or the

with more specific rules
applies only

dumping

(b)

.

to deal with the

circumvention problem unilaterally, pending on a multilateral solution via the

Anti-Dumping Committee

274

277

where there

duties

.

is

EC

because Article 13 (2) cover the assembly circumvention

And, according to a Commission

no reason

to

official, Article

13(1)

do something other than to circumvent

anti-

278
.

Assembly Circumvention

274

Seeid.atl65.

275

See Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 66,

at 7.

276

See Holmes, supra note 231,

at 162.

There are two types of circumventions, assembly

circumvention and non-assembly circumvention. The assembly circumvention
avoid anti-dumping duties by assembly operations in the

EC

or third countries.

is

one

that

Non-

assembly circumvention includes circumvention of anti-dumping duties by making a

wrong

origin declaration, importing

"knock down"

the product concerned.
211

2n

SeeHo\mes, supra note 231,
See

id.

at 172.

kits

and changing characteristics of

63
Article 13 (2) deals with the assembly circumvention,

assembly operation

in the

EC

and

in third countries

279
.

It

which

is

applicable to both

should be noted that the

provision does not require the relationship between the manufacturers and the assemblers.

The requirement of the
for a finding

relationship for the original

dumper has been

of circumvention under the EC's past regulations

assemblers can be the target of the

The provision

new

280
.

a basic pre-condition

Thus, even unrelated

anti-circumvention measure.

sets out three tests for the determination

of circumvention.

provides that "the operation started or substantially increased since, or just prior
initiation

to,

281
.

This criterion

is

Regulation adds the phrase,
to intend to

'just prior to the initiation

some

provision would be highly crucial in applying the

Second, the

new

of the anti-dumping investigation'.

broaden the scope of anti-circumvention measure. Since, generally

speaking, investments in foreign countries need

total

the

almost similar to the former counterpart

provisions in the Screwdriver Regulation and Regulation 2423/88 except that the

seems

new

lead time, the interpretation of this

new anti-circumvention

Regulation requires that the part constitute

60%

regulations.

or

more of the

value of the parts of the assembled product but the value added by the assembly

operation in the importing country

may not exceed 25% of the

ex-factory cost of the

finished product to extend an anti-dumping order to parts imported from the country
282

subject to the anti-dumping order

219

See Van Bael, supra note 64,

2m

28

at

.

The 60%

test

243.

See supra p.58.

New Regulation, supra note

2%2

ld.

it

of the anti-dumping investigation and the parts concerned are from the country

subject to measures"

It

First,

16, art. 13 (2)(I).

means

that parts

used to make the

64

60% 283 On

assembled product, not the value of the product, should be more than

.

new

other hand, unlike the Screwdriver Regulation and Regulation 2423/88, the

Regulation gives a safe-harbor percentage to the added value
value

is

more than 25

60% test,

to the

the assembly or completion operation
285
.

Thus,

if the

added

% of the total manufacturing cost, then the anti-circumvention rules

do not apply. Contrary

Dunkel Draft

test.

the

the

284
.

25%

test

The 25%

Thus, the second criterion in the

test

at the

value-added during

stems from Article 12 of the

new Regulation

25% added value test

existing 60/40 part test and the

looks only

in the

is

a mixture of the

Dunkel Draft

286
.

This added

value test will provide more specific guidelines in business decision making, especially to
investors interested in the

Community, and reduce more or

less the

range of discretion in

determining circumvention.
Finally, the

dumping

duties

287
.

assembly production should undermine the remedial effects of antiThis

new and

controversial condition originated from the anti-

circumvention provisions in the Dunkel Text

288
.

This provision was included with

recognition of the criticism that the Screwdriver Regulation did not meet the essential

requirements under the Tokyo

Round Anti-dumping Code because

it

without a separate finding that the components themselves had been

2ii

See Holmes, supra note 231,

284

assessed duties

dumped and

that

at 167.

/^. at 169.

285

See Hunter, supra note 234,

AD Draft, art.

assembly or production should exceed

12.

70%

It

of the value of all parts and added value

should be less than 25%.
2t6

See

287

New Regulation, supra note

2

Van

Bael, supra note 64,

at

243.

16, art. 13 (2)

™See Holmes, supra note 231, at!70.

provided that imported parts used in

(iii).

.

65
injury

had been occurred

Community

in the

plant

is

not causing any injury, there

And,

it

should be noted that the

dumping
products

in relation to the

291
.

The reference

Commission

new

is

no need

292
.

.

In other words, if the

to take anti-circumvention

normal values previously established for the
to

assembly

measures

290
.

Regulation requires that there must be evidence of

dumping does not mean

will use previously established

of assembled products

289

industry

like or similar

The

a full analysis of dumping.

normal values

in

comparison with the prices

However, since there may be a number of potential problems

occurred in assembly operations such as changes in models and gap in time between the
calculation of normal values and export prices, the

obliged to look at normal values again

new

293
.

Community

authorities

may well

Collectively speaking, since, even though the

Regulation does not require the same injury

test

and finding of dumping,

this

requirement provides an alternative methodology having similar effects. Thus,
to improve,

(c)

more

be

it is

likely

or less, transparency in anti-circumvention proceedings.

New Certification Procedure
Article 13 (4) provides that products shall not be subject to registration or

measures where they are accompanied by a customs

certificate declaring that the

importation of the goods does not constitute circumvention. This certificate will
certain products, parts or exporters

2&9

See McDermott, supra note 241,

290

See Holmes, supra note 23 1

29

,

'New Regulation, supra note

292

29i

See Holmes, supra note 23 1

See

id.

at 1

exempted from the scope of the anti-circumvention

at

322.

71

16, art. 13 (2)

,

make

atl 7

1

(iii).

66
investigation from the

moment

according to the Explanatory
initiation

294

295

id.

becomes

clear that they should be so

Memorandum,

of a circumvention investigation

See, Explanatory

See

it

Memorandum, supra

exempted 2

**4
.

And

the certificate can be obtained only after

295
.

note 66,

at 8.

Chapter III
Conclusion

The new Regulation provides more
anti-dumping regulations. This
views.

The

is

past regulations have

Community

authorities.

and clear-cut rules than the former

quite a positive evolution
left

margin of discretion both
296

determination of injury in the past
less

from the exporting countries'

considerable discretion in the hands of the

Because of ambiguously defined

institutions could enjoy the

of discretion more or

detailed

.

because the

rules, the

Community

in the finding

However, the new Regulation

new

of dumping and the
will reduce the range

Regulation provides more detailed rules in

almost every aspect of the anti-dumping area. Furthermore, the exporters will enjoy a

much

broader legal certainty in future anti-dumping proceedings.

On the

other hand, the

new

which can be challenged under the

Regulation

WTO.

It

still

contains a few unilateral provisions

would be

interesting to see

applies those unilateral rules to concrete cases and copes with the
a

much

how the EC

WTO challenges under

stronger dispute settlement system.

Collectively speaking, even though the

changes occurred in the

URAA,

it

new Regulation does

follows the main stream of the

not fully reflect the

URAA. Some

experts

say that the keys to reasonable anti-dumping laws are predictability and substantive and

procedural fairness

297
.

In order to achieve predictability

and fairness

in the

EC

anti-

296

See generally Sylvia Ostry, Europe 1992 and the Evolution of the Multilateral Trading
System, 22 Case
297

W.

Res.

J.

Intl L. 3 1 1,326 (1990).

Vulmust and Waer, supra note

57, at 74.

67

68

dumping proceedings,

the

Community

institutions' strong will to build consistent

unbiased practice should be accompanied with clear rules

in the

new

and

Regulation.
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